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ABSTRACT: Before statutory enactments in the nineteenth century granted mar-
ried women a limited set of property rights, the separate estate trust was, by and
large, the sole form of married women's property. Although the separate estate
allowed married women to circumvent the law of coverture, historians have
generally viewed the separate estate as an ineffective vehicle for extending
property rights to married women. In this Article, I reappraise the separate es-
tate's utility and argue that Chancery's separate estate jurisprudence during the
eighteenth century was a critical first step in the establishment of married
women as property-holders. Separate estates guaranteed critical financial provi-
sioning for wives seeking to escape unhappy marriages, allowed wives to re-
cover debts from their husbands, and enabled wives to alienate property, there-
by controlling transfers of wealth. Moreover, Chancery's jurisprudence
inscribed a married woman's property rights into legal precedent, and, ultimate-
ly, ascribed individual identity to the married woman. Accordingly, Chancery's
support for the married woman's separate estate can be seen as the beginning of
the end of coverture.
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INTRODUCTION
Oh, my sweetest Lizzy! . . . What pin-money, what jewels, what car-
riages you will have! ... I am so pleased-so happy. Such a charming
man! So handsome! So tall! Oh, my dear Lizzy! Pray apologise for my
having disliked him so much before.'
- Mrs. Bennett, Pride and Prejudice
Perhaps the most widely known reference to a married woman's separate
estate is Mrs. Bennett's exclamation of joy at the end of Pride and Prejudice,
when she learns of Elizabeth's betrothal to Mr. Darcy. As Mrs. Bennett rhapso-
dizes about Lizzy's marriage-and all the benefits it will bring-readers infer
from Mrs. Bennett's excitement that pin money was spending money allotted to
the fortunate wives of wealthy men. Pin money was one form of personal al-
lowance. Pin money was also an early-modem form of married women's prop-
erty known as a separate estate.
1. JANE AUSTEN, PRIDE AND PREJUDICE 318 (Alfred Knopf 1991) (1813).
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Although little-known in modem legal circles, the separate estate was, by
and large, the sole form of married women's property before statutory enact-
ments granted married women property rights in the nineteenth century. In its
most basic form, a separate estate was any assets put in trust for a woman, such
that it was for her "sole and separate use" and not available to her husband or
his creditors. Fathers and other family members, women themselves, and even
the Court of Chancery could establish separate estate trusts at any point in a
woman's life, but since these trusts were primarily intended to protect the prop-
erty rights of a woman subject to the disability of coverture, most separate es-
tates were created as part of a marriage settlement.
Sir William Blackstone, in a famous passage from the first volume of his
1765 Commentaries, described the doctrine of coverture as such:
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the
very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the
marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the
husband: under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs every
thing; and is therefore called in our law-French a feme-covert .... 2
A wife was not a full juridical being in the eyes of the common law, and
she possessed only a limited set of legal rights.3 A married woman could not
sue or be sued; she could not form contracts or buy and sell property apart from
her husband.4 Moreover, once a woman was married, any property that the
woman brought to the marriage came under the control of her husband.5 The
common law courts prioritized the rights of the husband as the head of the
household over those of the woman who was "covered." The separate estate
allowed the married woman a way around the rules of coverture because the
wife did not legally own the property. Because the separate estate was a trust,
the trustee held legal title while the wife held equitable title.
2. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442. For an attempt at explaining coverture's ori-
gins, see Norma Basch, The Legal Fiction of Marital Unity in Nineteenth-Century America, 5 FEMINIST
STUD. 346, 347 (1979) ("The concept of marital unity['s] ... religious origins were in the one-flesh doc-
trine of Christianity, [and the doctrine's] empirical roots were in the customs of medieval Normandy.").
3. See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 550-57 (4th ed. 2005). Baker
notes that, "[1]ike most legal fictions [coverture] was not universally applicable: for instance, the wife
was not executed for her husband's crimes, or made answerable for his debts." Id. at 551. For a good
overview of the complexity of coverture, see MARRIED WOMEN AND THE LAW: COVERTURE IN
ENGLAND AND THE COMMON LAW WORLD (Tim Stretton & Krista Kesselring eds., 2013).
4. See I BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *442-45.
5. AMY LOUISE ERICKSON, WOMEN AND PROPERTY IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 24-25 (1993).
All "moveables" or "chattels"-which included money, clothing, jewelry, furniture, and other personal
goods-became the property of the husband, as did any leasehold land. A wife's dowry, or portion, also
came under the control of her husband. A married woman retained title to her freehold, and in theory the
husband could not dispose of it without her consent. However, a wife had no right to any income the
property produced. Id.
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I argue in this Article that the separate estate had real value-in practical,
precedential, and theoretical terms-for married women. In practical terms,
separate estates provided married women with the financial support to escape
abusive marriages; allowed married women to act as creditors of their husbands
and recover money borrowed or charged to their separate estates; and enabled
married women to alienate both real and personal property without consent. In
precedential terms, Chancery's jurisprudence built the foundation for an in-
crease in married women's property rights by securing a legal foothold for mar-
ried women in the realm of property and entrenching in legal precedent the idea
that a woman could in certain respects act as a feme sole, or unmarried woman,
even while under the disability of coverture.6 Furthermore, the separate estate
allowed a husband and wife to have separate economic interests. By conceding
this notion, Chancery helped to rend a significant theoretical fracture in the law
of coverture and re-create the wife as an individual in her own right-a nascent
property owner and economic agent within the household.
Despite these benefits that flowed to married women from the separate es-
tate, historians have viewed the separate estate as an ineffective means of ex-
tending property rights. Scholars stress that a wife's control over her separate
estate was subject to control by trustees, and that the wife did not always con-
trol capital but rather benefitted only from the trust's income.7 Furthermore,
scholars argue that these trusts were designed to protect family wealth rather
than financially empower wives, and that the pursuit of wealth accumulation
disallowed for the generous provisioning of married women. Susan Staves
points out that "the inventors of the new legal rules [concerning separate prop-
erty] were motivated more by desires to facilitate the transmission of signifi-
cant property from male to male and to ensure a basic level of protection for
women and young children than they were ... in increasing the autonomy of
married women.' 8 Highlighting the axiomatic nature of the principle of family
wealth preservation, and stating it with characteristic wit, Samuel Johnson re-
marked: "It is mighty foolish to let a stranger have [your estate] because he
marries your daughter."
9
To better understand how separate estates provisioned and truly benefitted
married women, I analyze the leading separate estate cases litigated in the
6. See BAKER, supra note 3, at 551 ("In the law French ... she was said to befeme covert, as op-
posed tofeme sole (single woman), and her husband was her baron (lord).").
7. See Susan Moller Okin, Patriarchy and Married Women's Property in England: Questions on
Some Current Views, 17 EIGHTEENTH CENTURY STUD. 121, 124-25 (1983).
8. SUSAN STAVES, MARRIED WOMEN'S SEPARATE PROPERTY IN ENGLAND, 1660-1833, at 221-22
(1990); see also EILEEN SPRING, LAW, LAND, AND FAMILY: ARISTOCRATIC INHERITANCE IN ENGLAND
1300 TO 1800, at 8-66 (1993).
9. JAMES BOSWELL, BOSWELL's LIFE OF JOHNSON 225 (Charles Grosvenor Osgood ed., Charles
Seribner's Sons 1917) (1791).
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Court of Chancery during the eighteenth century.'0 Concentrating solely on lit-
igated cases undoubtedly introduces a certain bias into the analysis, skewing
discussion toward those parties who had sufficient resources to deem litigation
worthwhile and could afford litigation.II Moreover, as Tim Stretton remarks,
"for every marriage settlement, trust or use that went wrong ... a larger and in-
calculable number went right."'12 Nonetheless, I believe that this set of cases has
a very specific and distinctive value. First, these cases offer valuable insight in-
to how the separate state actually worked by providing us with a more detailed
knowledge about the legal mechanics involved. In addition, although the sepa-
rate estate agreements that were litigated in Chancery likely represent a small
fraction of the separate estates agreements executed in total, the litigated
agreements highlight what legal claims and questions were the most conten-
tious and therefore posed the greatest obstacles to property ownership for mar-
ried women.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I examines the legal mechanics of
the separate estate and provides context, describing the landscape of property
ownership for married women at the time. This Part includes more detail about
the broader story of the decline in women's property rights in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries. Part II contains an analysis of the leading separate es-
tate cases litigated in Chancery in the eighteenth century and a discussion of
how the separate estate actually benefitted women. In Part III, I offer a reap-
praisal of the separate estate's worth. I demonstrate that Chancery's separate
estate jurisprudence was a critical first step in the establishment of the married
woman as a property-holder because it provided women with financial autono-
my, inscribed married women's rights into legal precedent, and, ultimately, as-
10. My source materials are the circumscribed but robust set of separate estate cases litigated in
Chancery during the eighteenth century. For this paper, and my larger project, I comprehensively
searched Chancery Rolls, as well as the English Reports more generally, from 1550-1800 for all cases
dealing with the separate estate, separate property, separate maintenance, and pin money. While the
English Reports have been digitized and are available on HeinOnline at
http://heinonlinc.org/HOL/Index?collection=engrep, there is not an easy way to search for key terms
within the decisions. Nonetheless, summaries provided by the editors of the various volumes index the
cases from each term into categories, with Baron & Feme being the most relevant here. For my time
period, I undertook a review of all the Baron & Feme cases available, as identified through summaries,
indexes, and case referencing. The cases I discuss in this Article result from that search, and I focus, in
particular, on reported decisions with extensive analysis. The Court of Requests, in the seventeenth cen-
tury, had equity jurisdiction, and the Court of the Exchequer also had limited equity jurisdiction in both
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Because separate estate cases were overwhelmingly litigated in
Chancery, I have chosen to focus on cases from that court.
11. ERICKSON, supra note 5, at 103-13 According to Erickson, "historians agree that the separate
estate was employed only by the wealthiest segments of society, those who had substantial property to
protect, who would pay to draw up the necessary documents and who could afford to enforce the terms
of the trust in the Court of Chancery if necessary." Id. at 103.
12. TiM STRETTON, WOMEN WAGING LAW IN ELIZABETHAN ENGLAND 151 (1998); see also
ERICKSON, supra note 5, at 124 ("Litigation records, while they arc abundant and in some respects con-
veniently quantifiable, cannot indicate how often people established separate estates.").
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cribed individual identity to the married woman. Accordingly, Chancery's sup-
port for a married woman's separate estate can be seen as the beginning of the
end of coverture.
I. THE TRADITIONAL STORY OF THE SEPARATE ESTATE
The precise origin of the separate estate remains unknown, but Chancery
was ruling on cases concerning a married woman's separate property as early
as the end of the sixteenth century, during the final years of the reign of Queen
Elizabeth.13 During the two and a half centuries that followed, cases turning on
questions of separate property appeared with increasing regularity before
Chancery, evidencing the utility and popularity of that particular trust. As Mary
Prior remarks, cases turning on questions of separate property appeared with
increasing frequency due to "[f]avorable pronouncements in Chancery cases in
the 1630s ... [that] opened the way to a more confident use of trusts."'14 In the
first section of this Part, I explain the legal mechanics of the separate estate, de-
tailing how these trusts were created and administered. In the second section, I
place the separate estate in the larger context of women's property and provide
a fuller explanation of why the separate estate has been undervalued on account
of a perceived general decline in women's property rights during the same time
period.
A. The Legal Mechanics of the Separate Estate
A woman's father, family, husband, or even the woman herself could cre-
ate a separate estate at any time-before, during, or after marriage. The only
restriction was that a woman could not create a separate estate for herself once
she had entered into marriage because she was, at that point, restricted by the
13. There are conflicting accounts about the first separate estate case. Maria Cioni notes that
Walgrave v. Goldinge is the "case that is unanimously considered to be the foundation stone upon which
evolved the concept of a married woman's separate estate .. " MARIA L. CIONI, WOMEN AND LAW IN
ELIZABETHAN ENGLAND, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE COURT OF CHANCERY 171 (1985).
Marylynn Salmon, on the other hand, dates the origin of the separate estate to 1581 with the case
Avenant v. Kitchin. See MARYLYNN SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA
84(1989).
14. Mary Prior, Wives and Wills 1558-1700, in ENGLISH RURAL SOCIETY 1500-1800, at 201, 220
(John Chartres & David Hey eds., 1990). The increase in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in
marriage settlements generally, and strict settlements in particular, likely produced an increase in the
number of separate estates as well. However, it is difficult to know the precise numbers. There are some
important and valuable studies, particularly of strict settlements, that provide data. See, e.g., LLOYD
BONFIELD, MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS, 1601-1740 (1983); see also LAWRENCE STONE & JEANNE C.
FAWTIER STONE, AN OPEN ELITE? ENGLAND 1540-1880 (1984). Bonfield points out that a "majority [of
settlement documents] have been lost," and that any attempt to undertake a comprehensive analysis of
separate estate and marriage settlement agreements is plagued by source-based difficulties. See
BONFIELD, at xv.
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rules of coverture. Because of the restrictions that governed a married woman
under coverture, separate estates were most commonly created in anticipation
of marriage. 15
When the separate estate was created as part of a marriage settlement, any
property that the bride's family wished to settle for her use was put in trust and
the income (and sometimes the capital as well) was subsequently hers to direct
as she chose. Strict settlements, in which a daughter's portion and jointure were
settled when the father settled his estate on the oldest son, were also common.16
These agreements typically involved a groom's father settling a "life estate in
the groom followed by a jointure provision with the entail secured in the eldest
son to be produced by the union."17 Nonetheless, separate estates were still pos-
sible in conjunction with strict settlements because not all parts of an estate
were necessarily included in these strict settlements. A daughter's separate es-
tate could consist of land that had not been settled by the entail, which includ-
ed, for example, "new property" or "outlying parts of the larger estates."18 Ei-
ther way, the separate estate provisioned the wife during marriage and added to
her jointure in the event of her husband's death.
Separate estates were also commonly created in anticipation of second
marriages. In these cases women tended to create separate states for them-
selves using their jointure from the first marriage or any other assets that a wid-
ow possessed. As Amy Erickson remarks, "a second-time bride was older, per-
haps wealthier, and wiser at least in the ways of legal coverture than she had
been the first time around."'19 Accordingly, these women knew the creation of a
separate estate was the best way to protect the dower or jointure that they had
received from their first husbands.20 During marriage, married women fre-
quently became the beneficiaries of separate estate trusts through bequests
made by family members-including female family members, such as wid-
15. See ERICKSON, supra note 5, at 103; STAVES, supra note 8, at 133.
16. See discussion infra pages 10-13. A bride's portion was her dowry, and jointure was a private
settlement meant to provision a wife after the death of her spouse.
17. BONFIELD, supra note 14, at 46-47. Land not settled in entail was also used to provision young-
er sons and provide portions for other daughters. Id. at 104-05. The degree to which younger children
and daughters were in fact provisioned in this way remains debated. See SPRING, supra note 8 (arguing
that strict settlements decreased provisioning for daughters and younger children). Entails will be famil-
iar to readers of Pride and Prejudice, in which Mr. Collins benefitted from an entail on the Bennett es-
tate. See AUSTEN, supra note 1, at 111-12. An entail was "an estate that would pass forever in accord-
ance with a prescribed succession so that the holder of the possessory interest could neither alienate his
interest nor alter the subsequent line of succession." Steven J. Horowitz & Robert H. Sitkoff, Unconsti-
tutional Perpetual Trusts, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1769, 1775 (2014).
18. Christopher Clay, Marriage, Inheritance, and the Rise of Large Estates in England, 1660-1815,
21 ECON. HIST. REV. 503, 508, 510 (1968).
19. ERICKSON, supra note 5, at 123.
20. See CIONI, supra note 13, at 165 ("By the late sixteenth century, it was becoming popular for a
widow to have an estate in trust to her separate use especially when circumstances indicated that the
next spouse might be grasping or a spendthrift.").
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owed aunts, seeking to provision their female kin. Moreover, as we will see in
Part II, Chancery also had the power to create a separate estate for a wife dur-
ing marriage. In these situations, Chancery would intervene when there was
marital discord and allow the wife to live apart from her husband, giving her
financial means by identifying her pre-marital property and placing it into a ju-
dicially created separate estate trust for her benefit.21
Examples of how to convey property upon marriage to a daughter through
the formation of a separate estate could easily be found in conveyancing manu-
als. One of the most popular manuals was Sir Orlando Bridgman's, originally
published in 1699. Bridgman's manual offers a template for "A Demise to
Trustees for years, in Consideration and in Performance of a Promise and
Agreement before Marriage on the Behalf and for the Separate Maintenance of
the Wife. ' '22 The following language details what the clause within the settle-
ment might look like: "In a Conveyance to Trustees before Marriage ... That
the Trustees shall execute such Estates, as the Woman, as well whilst Covert as
Sole shall appoint ... And til such Appointment shall permit her to receive the
Profits to her separate Use excluding her Husband.,
23
It was common, as critics of the separate estate have observed, for fathers
to create a separate estate for a daughter with income-producing land, such that
the wife would enjoy a steady stream of income-and income alone-
throughout her marriage. Gilbert Horsman, in his Precedents in Conveyancing,
gives an example of what this type of settlement might have looked like:
[The trustees shall], by and out of the Rents, Issues and Profits of the
said Capital Messuage, Lands, Hereditaments and Premises, pay or
cause to be paid for and during the natural Life of [the daughter] one
Annuity, yearly Rent or Sum of 40f of like Money, by four equal quar-
terly payments .... 24
In some cases, however, the woman possessed fuller control of the capital
placed in trust for her benefit and was able to enjoy the income and bequeath
the property as she pleased. This was certainly the case when women created
trusts for themselves in anticipation of a second marriage. Elizabeth Dibben, a
wife and landowner in her own right, created the following settlement upon
marriage, described by the Chancellor in the case Churchill v. Dibben:
21. Because "there was a strong convention that the wife's portion should be used to purchase
land," this may have simplified the court's task. In all cases, the wife's portion was easily identifiable.
H.J. Habakkuk, Marriage Settlements in the Eighteenth Century, 32 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL
HIST. SOC'Y 15, 22 (1950).
22. 1 SIR ORLANDO BRIDGMAN'S CONVEYANCES 122 (London, Nutt, Nutt & Gosling 1725).
23. Id. at 132-33.
24. 1 GILBERT HORSMAN, PRECEDENTS IN CONVEYANCING 35 (London, Lintot 1744).
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[O]n the marriage of Thomas Dibben, Esq. and Elizabeth his wife, the
said Elizabeth conveys several lands and tenements to the use of her-
self for life, and so on, in strict settlement, to the issue of the marriage;
and, in default of such issue, as to part, to the use of the husband, as to
other part ... to the trustees, and their heirs ... for the benefit, and
behoof, of such person or persons, and for such estates, as she should,
notwithstanding her coverture, by deed, or will, or any writing purport-
ing to be so signed and sealed by her in the presence of two witnesses,
appoint.
25
Elizabeth Dibben created a separate estate trust that allowed her to benefit
from substantial income and assets during her life. Moreover, reserving to her-
self the power of appointment, she was able to devise the separate estate prop-
erty at her death.
A critical inclusion in the creation of these trusts was particular language
stating that the trust was for the "sole and separate use" of the bride-to-be or
wife. This crucial phrase signaled that the trust was indeed a separate estate
meant to benefit the wife and not available to the husband or anyone else seek-
ing to reach the assets. Bridgman's conveyancing manual gives this example of
how a parent could have created a separate estate through a bequest, highlight-
ing the degree to which the husband was barred from using the trust income
and assets as well as the importance of the "sole and separate use" language:
I do further will and appoint that my Daughter D. shall have one Annu-
ity or yearly Rent of 20. of lawful Money of England, to be paid unto
her own proper Hands, and not unto the Hands of her Husband, or to
the Hands of any other Husband, with whom she may hereafter marry,
nor to the Hands of any other Person or Persons that may claim the
same by virtue of any Assignment or otherwise, but only to her own
Hands for her sole and separate Use.
26
In the first separate estate cases, in the early seventeenth century, Chancery
required the precise formulation to be present in the wording of the legal doc-
ument. By the eighteenth century, however, the court took a more flexible ap-
proach and inferred intent from any number of similar expressions.27 By the
end of the eighteenth century, the separate estate trust had become such a
common practice that Henry Ballow stated confidently, "[I]t is certain, that a
wife may have a separate estate from her husband, as by agreement, before or
25. Churchill v. Dibben, (1754) 96 Eng. Rep. 1310 (Ch.) 1311; 3 Keny. 68, 68-69.
26. 2 SIR ORLANDO BRIDGMAN'S CONVEYANCES 151 (London, Nutt, Nutt & Gosling 1725).
27. 1 BRIDGMAN, supra note 22, at 158-59.
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after marriage; or by decree, for ill usage or alimony; or otherwise secured in
trustees' hands for her."
28
B. The Story of Women's Property Rights in Decline
A major reason that some historians often undervalue the separate estate as
a vehicle for extending property rights to married women is that the broader
story of women's property rights in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is
not a wholly positive one. Apart from the separate estate, women's property
rights were, some historians suggest, in decline. The two primary pieces of evi-
dence in support of this argument are the replacement of dower by jointure and
the rise of the strict settlement. These claims are highly contested, and my aim
here is not to resolve the actual impact of these changes in property rights for
women. My goal, rather, is to illustrate how the story of the separate estate has
been swept into the greater story of decline without sufficient analysis of its
merits. Accordingly, a short overview of the prevailing narrative of decline is
useful.
The first claim about the decline of married women's property rights con-
cerns the gradual elimination of dower and substitution of jointure in its place.
What a bride acquired in exchange for her lost property rights upon marriage
was a right to dower or, by the sixteenth century, jointure. Dower was a one-
third life estate in the husband's freehold estate, which arose on his death.
29
Dower was intended to sustain a widow after the death of her husband,30 and
escaped the strictures of coverture because a wife would come into possession
of her dower only upon the death of her husband, when she would once again
be a feme sole.
31
The common law enforced dower by means of a writ that the widow could
use if she needed legal help recovering her dower property.32 By the early six-
teenth century, however, dower rights had been destabilized by the use (an ear-
ly form of the trust) and the common law rule that there was no dower of a
28. HENRY BALLOW, A TREATISE OF EQUITY, WITH THE ADDITION OF MARGINAL REFERENCES
AND NOTES BY JOHN FONBLANQUE, ESQ. 93-95 (photo. reprint 1979) (1793).
29. SPRING, supra note 8, at 40. A husband's freehold estate was comprised of land and property
that the husband owned outright. Property subject to dower claims included lands and houses, shares in
public companies and mines, and more idiosyncratic items such as "the profits of stallage, of a fair, of
the office of Marshalsea, of keeping a park, of a piscary." See OWEN DAVIES TUDOR, A SELECTION OF
LEADING CASES ON REAL PROPERTY, CONVEYANCING, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS AND DEEDS
42 (London, Butterworths 1856).
30. STAVES, supra note 8, at 45. Commentators also described the widow as possessing a "moral
right" to dower. Id.
31. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129-39.
32. CIONI, supra note 13, at 176. A woman could use either the writ of right of dower or the writ of
dower unde nihil habet in attempting recovery. See Alison Reppy, The Development of the Common-
Law Forms ofAction: Part 11, 23 BROOK. L. REV. 38, 54-55 (1956-1957).
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trust. Consequently, a husband could place his lands in a use or trust to gain
taxation benefits and thereafter the land was no longer subject to dower.33 The
enactment of the Statute of Uses in 1536 ended this practice,34 but jointure was
already being used as a practical replacement for a widow's dower by that time.
Jointure, unlike dower, was not statutorily created. Rather, it was a private
contract made between the parties to marriage before entering into marriage,
often as part of the marriage settlement.35 Jointure could take two forms, one
being the creation of joint life estates to the bride and groom with survivor
rights to the widow for life.36 In this form, a woman's father or relatives created
a jointure by including in the marriage settlement "some particular lands of the
intended husband to his and his wife's use, in joint tenancy for their lives, as a
provision for her in the event of her surviving him."37 The second form, which
originally involved land conveyed to trustees for the use of a married woman,
38
became after the Statute of Uses nothing more than a "guaranteed annual reve-
nue from land payable to a wife should she survive her husband."39This second
form of jointure was originally meant to offer the husband a means of provid-
ing for a widow while still holding land in trust, but even after the Statute of
Uses ended that concern, the jointure was a popular alternative to dower.
The advantage of the jointure was that the wife "had an estate as soon as
jointure was made," endowing her with a present as well as a future interest,
whereas dower only vested the wife with a future interest.40 Unlike dower,
however, there was no writ at common law to provide remedy for a jointure
claim if conflict arose.41 In the absence of a writ that would give the common
law court authority over the claim, and because jointure assets were often held
42in trust, disputes about jointure came to Chancery.
As Susan Staves and Eileen Spring both remark, the liberal story concern-
ing the replacement of dower by jointure is one of progress with respect to the
alienability of land. Because a widow's dower constituted an interest in a hus-
33. In the preamble to the Statute of Uses, concern for defrauded women barred from dower by the
rule concerning uses is mentioned as one reason for enacting the statute. 27 Hen. 8, c. 10., § 1
34. SPRING, supra note 8, at 47. The preamble of the Statute of Uses states that a goal of the statute
is to halt the defrauding of widows. Id.
35. STAVES, supra note 8, at 29-30; see also SPRING, supra note 8, at 58 ("With the transfer of
dower into jointure, an invariable right in law had become a matter of private contract.").
36. 6 JOHN BAKER, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND 689 (2003); see also SPRING,
supra note 8, at 43.
37. 1 R.S. DONNISON ROPER, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY ARISING FROM THE
RELATION BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE 461 (Philadelphia, John S. Littell 1841).
38. 6 BAKER supra note 36, at 685.
39. STAVES, supra note 8, at 29.
40. CIONI, supra note 13, at 198.
41. Id.
42. Amy Louise Erickson, Common Law Versus Common Practice: The Use of Marriage Settle-
ments in Early Modern England, 43 ECON. HIST. REV. 21, 24 (1990).
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band's freehold land, dower was thought to be a "great clog to alienations.'A
3
Jointure did not present the same problem. However, jointure also allowed a
husband to settle considerably less than a third of his estate on his wife, and
freed husbands from any statutory obligation to provide for their widows.44 A
wife's jointure was related in most cases to her portion and, by the eighteenth
century, jointure "usually operated on a proportional basis of ten percent of the
amount which the wife had brought to the marriage.' 45 Furthermore, because
lawmakers and landholders were concerned about the possibility that a widow
could benefit from both her dower and jointure, the Statute of Uses decreed that
any wife who had a jointure settled upon her at marriage was barred from re-
covering dower.
46
The second claim that some historians make concerns the detrimental ef-
fect of the strict settlement on women. Foundational work by H.J. Habakkuk
and others posited early in the debate that the strict settlement-in which the
father settled the majority of his estate on his eldest son for life upon marriage
with a trustee-preserved contingent remainder going to the first son of the mar-
riage-in fact benefitted daughters and future brides, because their portions
were firmly established through the settlement.7 Blackstone suggested as much
in his Commentaries, tating that the strict settlement helped to "secure in fami-
ly settlements a provision for the future children of an intended marriage, who
before were usually left at the mercy of the particular tenant for life." 48
Other historians, however, have strongly contested this proposition. Eileen
Spring, in particular, has taken issue with the idea that strict settlements bene-
fitted women. Spring argues that "the character of [the strict settlement] is
summed up in three words: patrilineal, primogenetive, and patriarchal.... We
should not be impressed by the fact that settlements provided for all members
of the family. Families have always been provided for by some means or an-
43. SPRING, supra note 8, at 48 (citing 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 31, at *137); see also STAVES,
supra note 8, at 32.
44. See generally SPRING, supra note 8, at 39-66 (describing how the increased use of jointure as
opposed to dower resulted in decreased financial security for widows); see also STAVES, supra note 8, at
25-55.
45. CIONI, supra note 13, at 196. Erickson charts the decline of the portion/jointure ratio, noting
that in the early seventeenth century the ratio was closer to five to one. ERICKSON, supra note 5, at 119;
see also SPRING, supra note 8, at 50 ("The ratio then steadily fell in the century after the Statute of Uses,
clearly indicating a significant decline in the bargaining power of wives.").
46. SPRING, supra note 8, at 47-8.
47. See Habakkuk, supra note 21, at 20-30. Habakkuk's primary thesis was that there was a strong
connection between the development of the strict settlement and the rise of "great estates"; see also
BONFIELD, supra note 14, at 93-122; STONE & STONE, supra note 14. Tim Stretton has succinctly sum-
marized the debate-at-large, stating: "Most agree that patriarchs saw the entails allowed in settlements as
a useful means of shoring up family estates, preventing leaks of property to other families through the
conduit of daughters, or wastage at the hands of spendthrift sons. They disagree about heir application
and effectiveness." STRETTON, supra note 12, at 119.
48. BONFIELD, supra note 14, at 102 (citing 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 31, at * 172).
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other."49 Strict settlements, according to Spring, likely decreased the amounts
given to daughters because they limited fathers' discretionary ability to provide
for them.50 Moreover, as Susan Staves has pointed out, this form of historiog-
raphy characterizes women as "bearers or sources of assets .. . or dependents
whose needs take assets away from the heroic job of accumulation."
51
Consequently, feminist versions of the history of women's property hold-
ing during this period have disputed the conventional view that the eighteenth
century was witness to both an increase in women's education, agency, and
wealth as well as a rise in "domesticity' 52 and "companionate marriages.' 53 In-
stead, feminist historians argue that the eighteenth century was a period that
sentimentalized women in order to demonstrate that they lacked the "rationality
required for the active management of property."54 From this perspective, the
eighteenth century was one of "increasing legal restrictions" on women's man-
agement and ownership of property, masked by circulating theories of equality
and rationality.
55
Placed in this context, it is not surprising that the story of the separate es-
tate has been subsumed into a larger story of decline and inequality. Nonethe-
less, as Amy Erickson has remarked, this historiographical focus on the effects
of the strict settlement and related theories of the family has obscured analysis
of other forms of settlement, trust forms, and property ownership for women. 56
In fact, Erickson proposes, "[t]here is clear evidence that women had an eco-
nomic importance within the family which we continue to overlook.,57 This
Article seeks to recover this overlooked history and positive impact of the sepa-
rate estate, as viewed through the lens of litigation in Chancery.
II. UNHAPPY MARRIAGES AND UNPAID CREDITORS
The separate estate cases litigated in Chancery fell into three distinct cate-
gories. One category of cases was constituted by claims related to marital sepa-
ration. Because of the limited options for divorce during the period, both legal
and informal separations were popular options for unhappy couples. In these
49. SPRING, supra note 8, at 144.
50. Id. at 17-19.
51. STAVES, supra note 8, at 203.
52. RANDOLPH TRUMBACH, THE RISE OF THE EGALITARIAN FAMILY: ARISTOCRATIC KINSHIP AND
DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND 69-163 (1978).
53. Id.; see also Lawrence Stone, The Rise of the Nuclear Family in Early Modern England, in THE
FAMILY IN HISTORY 13, 13-57 (C.E. Rosenberg ed., 1975).
54. STAVES, supra note 8, at 226.
55. ERICKSON, supra note 5, at 233; see also Susan Moller Okin, Women and the Making of the
Sentimental Family, 11 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 72, 73-75 (1984).
56. Erickson, supra note 42, at 22. Erickson argues that "the primary purpose of a marriage settle-
ment in early modem England was to preserve the wife's property rights." Id.
57. Id.
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situations, claims frequently arose concerning maintenance and alimony for
wives living apart from their husbands because of desertion, cruelty, or other
conflict. A second category of cases was comprised of creditors' claims and
turned on questions of estate accounting. These cases implicated the ability of
the wife's separate estate to act as a creditor with respect to the husband as well
as the right of a third-party creditor to recover money for a husband's debts
from a wife's separate estate. The third category was constituted by claims
concerning a wife's right to devise her separate estate; these estate battles
raised similar questions concerning the extent of a married woman's power
over her separate estate
A. Marital Breakdown and a Wife's Separate Estate
The first separate estate cases, which appeared before Chancery in the late
sixteenth century, were cases involving marital discord and separation. George
Spence wrote that the '.first direct recognition of the wife being capable of sep-
arate rights during coverture, distinct from her husband, appears in the instance
of the wife living apart under a deed of separation."58 Spence was referring to
Sankey v. Golding from 1579, a separate maintenance case involving the claim
of a married woman to support when she and her husband decided to live apart
because of "discord growing between them." 59 The court concluded that pro-
ceeds from the sale of real estate belonging to the wife would go to form her
separate estate, and consequently placed the proceeds in the hands of a trustee
under the decree that the money was to be used for Eliza Sankey's "mainte-
nance.
60
In similar cases that followed, Chancery repeatedly stepped in to resolve
questions relating to support for an estranged wife and decree, as appropriate,
the establishment of a judicially created separate estate. Specifically, Chancery
identified a wife's pre-marital property and placed it in trust in order to estab-
lish a source of income for her during the marital separation. These separate s-
tate trusts generally only provided women with an income stream. However,
these judicially created separate estates provided material benefit to wives who
had been treated with cruelty or otherwise come into conflict with their hus-
bands, allowing them to escape abusive marriages.
58. 1 GEORGE SPENCE, THE EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY 595 (Lon-
don, William Stevens 1846).
59. Sankey v. Golding, (1579) 21 Eng. Rep. 46 (Ch.)46; 22 Elz. Cary. 124, 124.
60. Id. Even in marriage, a wife retained title to freehold land (land owned outright), even though it
came under the control of the husband. For a discussion concerning a married woman's property rights,
see supra note 5.
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1. Provisioning Abandoned and Abused Wives
When a husband abandoned his wife, he was in dereliction of his marital
duty. Both at common law and in Chancery, the husband owed a legal duty of
support to his wife.61 Blackstone remarked that the husband was "bound to
provide his wife with necessaries by law, as much as himself; and if she con-
tracts debts for them, he is obliged to pay them."62 In the common law courts,
providing "necessaries" generally meant keeping the wife according to the
standard of living dictated by the couple's social class, not at subsistence lev-
el.63 When the husband was derelict in this duty, legal remedy was available to
the injured wife. The remedies were different, however, at common law and in
Chancery.
The common law allowed a wife to charge necessaries at the shop of a
merchant, who subsequently had the legal right to recover the money from the
64husband. The common law premise was that the husband "authorised [the
wife] generally to contract as his representative for such things as being within
her domestic province may be supposed to be entrusted to her management."
65
Accordingly, in Dent v. Scott, a court held that "the wife may charge the hus-
band for necessaries, as apparel, diet and lodging, in case that the husband does
not provide them for her."66 The main problem with this remedy, from the
wife's perspective, was the difficulty finding a sympathetic merchant who was
willing to go to the trouble of bringing a lawsuit in order to recover his profit.
67
Moreover, a husband could give notice to a merchant that the wife was not enti-
61. See BARON AND FEME: A TREATISE OF THE COMMON LAW CONCERNING HUSBANDS AND
WIVES 9 (Garland Publishing 1979) (1700) ("Though our Law makes the Woman subject to the Hus-
band... [s]o he may not starve her, but must provide Maintenance for her.").
62. See I BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *442.
63. Nonetheless, defining "necessaries" was a source of contention between couples disputing debt
in court and the court either turned the question over to the jury or designated a master to investigate and
assess. See STAVES, supra note 8, at 131, 193; Colmer v. Colmer, (1729) 25 Eng. Rep. 304 (Ch.) 306;
Mos. 113, 121.
64. See generally BAKER, supra note 36, at 861-62, for an example of a merchant seeking to recov-
er who used a writ of indebitatus assumpsil, via the claim that the husband had undertaken a debt and
not satisfied it.
65. Bolton v. Prentice, (1745) 93 Eng. Rep. 1136 (Ch.) 1137; 2 Str. 1212, 1214. The spelling of
certain words in the report has been modernized. Hereinafter, all spelling in reports cited will conform to
modem standards.
66. Dent v. Scott, (1681) 82 Eng. Rep. 916 (Ch.) 916; Aleyn 61, 61. If, however, the husband pro-
vided an allowance to the wife, in the form of pin money or a separate maintenance, the wife was not
allowed to charge necessaries on her husband's credit. Id. Moreover, as the court in Bolton noted, a great
deal "depends upon the manner in which the separation between the parties has taken place." 93 Eng.
Rep. at 1137; 2 Str. at 1214.
67. STAVES, supra note 8, at 131-33, 145.
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tled to credit, effectively blocking the wife from obtaining goods when she in
fact had a legal right to them.
68
For these reasons, wives often preferred to bring their claims in Chancery,
where the usual remedy was a decree of separate maintenance instead of charg-
ing privileges. The amount of maintenance Chancery awarded had the potential
to be greater than any amount of charging privileges. In addition, separate
maintenance freed the wife from seeking out sympathetic merchants and cir-
cumventing the husband's influence on the merchants. A decree for separate
maintenance from Chancery was therefore a more reliable option and an attrac-
tive alternative to common law remedy.69
In cases of abandonment, Chancery's goal was to provide for the wife and
find support mechanisms other than the public fisc.70 To this end, Chancery
took judicial notice of separate property when possible, looking back to the
wife's portion and translating that amount into a judicially created separate es-
tate for her maintenance.71 The 1729 case Colmer v. Colmer was exemplary in
demonstrating the travails of an abandoned wife and Chancery's remedy.72 The
plaintiff wife in that case, a widow who was in possession of a third of her first
husband's estate, had a generous separate estate that had been established upon
her second marriage.
Specifically, £4,000 from her share in her first husband's estate, was
"lodged in the hands of her trustees in trust, to pay the interest thereof to the
plaintiff for life, for her sole and separate use, and if she died before her intend-
ed husband, then to pay the principal to such uses, and to such persons, as she,
by deed or will, should direct and appoint; and for want of such appointment, to
the husband; but if the husband died first, to pay the principal to her."73 After
establishing this separate estate, Mrs. Colmer gave her second husband a life
interest in the residue of her assets derived from her first marriage, amounting
to £8,000 that he was to have "the sole management hereof in trade."74 The
remainder was to go upon his death either directly to their children as well as
her children from the first marriage or to her in trust and then to the children.
68. For the rules on publicity and the importance of what pieces of information the tradesmen had,
see I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 344 n.48 (E. Duyckinck
1827) (1765).
69. See STAVES, supra note 8, at 131, 145.
70. See LAWRENCE STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE: ENGLAND 1530-1987, 142 (1990) (describing the
financial consequences women faced when deserted by their husbands and noting the large proportion of
deserted wives on relief rolls). John Fraser MacQueen, in his 1848 treatise about marital obligation, stat-
ed: "The only legal reason why a husband should support his wife is, that she may not become a burden
on the parish. So long as that calamity is averted, the wife has no claim on her husband." JOHN FRASER
MACQUEEN, THE RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF HUSBAND AND WIFE 42 (London, S. Sweet 1848).
71. The exception was when a husband left his wife in the line of work. See Bullock v. Menzies,
(1799) 31 Eng. Rep. 413 (Ch.); 4 Ves. Jun. 797.
72. Colmer v. Colmer, (1729) 25 Eng. Rep. 301 (Ch.); Mos. 113.
73. Id. at 301; Mos. at 113-14.
74. Id. at 301; Mos. at 114.
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Moreover, the second husband covenanted to settle "£4,000 out of his own es-
tate in trust, in case the wife survived him, to pay the interest to her for life, and
after her decease to pay the principal, as she should appoint, and for want of
such appointment, to their children."
75
Despite all this intricate financial planning, not long after the marriage had
been solemnized, the husband, in debt and "desirous to get into his hands [the
portions],76 that his wife had settled on her children from the previous mar-
riage, began to treat his wife poorly. He denied his wife access to her children,
turned her friends away, "gave the management of his family to a footman,
[and] encouraged the servants to insult her."77 When her husband disappeared
without notice, Mrs. Colmer discovered his whereabouts in Portsmouth and
went there in an attempt to reunite with him. Finding that her husband was on
board a ship, she hired a boat but her husband spotted her rowing toward him
and "persuaded the captain to cut his cables, and set sail, so that she could not
come up to him.",78 Thwarted in her efforts to reconcile, Mrs. Colmer returned
to London, where she found herself locked out of her house, and forced to stay
with friends. Dealing a final blow, Mr. Colmer put all personal and family as-
sets, including Mrs. Colmer's clothes and jewelry, "under colour of a deed of
trust.
' 79
Because the husband had placed his assets in a trust with a "design to bar
[his wife] of all maintenance," the Chancellor concluded that Mrs. Colmer had
"no remedy but in this court."80 The Chancellor held that Mrs. Colmer was en-
titled not only to the income from her separate estate but to the allowance
promised her by her husband. The Chancellor referred the case to a master to
detennine the proper amount of "maintenance according to the circumstances
of the husband," taking into account the portion she brought to the marriage as
well as her husband's social position.8' That amount would be put into trust for
the wife and its income would provide her maintenance, augmenting what she
75. Id. at 302; Mos. at 114.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 302; Mos. at 115.
79. Id.
80. Colmer v. Colmer, (1729) 25 Eng. Rep. 304 (Ch.) 306; Mos. 118, 122. Before ruling on the
case, the Chancellor explained: "This is a case proper not only for the spiritual Court, but also for a court
of common law." Id. at 305; Mos. at 120. The case was potentially proper for the spiritual court inas-
much as there existed a question about fault in the breakdown of the marriage. However, Mrs. Colmer's
claim did not include a suit for separation or divorce and this fact ultimately rendered the claim beyond
the scope of the spiritual court. Mrs. Colmer might also have had a claim at common law, the Chancellor
observed, because "it is a breach of the peace in the husband not to maintain his wife." Id. The breach of
peace was a common law offence. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, RENEE LETrOW LERNER & BRUCE P. SMITH,
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 31-
32(2010).
81. Colmer, 25 Eng. Rep. at 306. Factors worthy of particular attention were "the portion she
brought, and.., the present circumstances of the husband." Id.
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already had from her separate estate income. Both of these separate estates pro-
vided Mrs. Colmer with a financial safety net. The separate estate she estab-
lished for herself with the assets from her first marriage gave her guaranteed
income and the right to appoint the assets through her will. The judicially creat-
ed trust did not give her the same robust property right-Mrs. Colmer had no
right to appoint the property-however, it guaranteed her standard of living in
the absence of her husband and checked the husband's attempts to shield assets
from her reach.
In 1740, eleven years after Colmer, Chancery ruled on a similar case of de-
sertion in Watkyns v. Watkyns. Watkyns was likewise a case in which the wife
had a "considerable fortune" from her first marriage, and upon entering into her
second marriage with Watkyns she "trusted him to draw up a bond . . . to se-
cure seventeen hundred pounds for the wife, in case she should survive him."
82
After the marriage, the relationship soured with mutual accusations of cruelty
and infidelity, and the wife brought a bill in Chancery was "to have a mainte-
nance out of her fortune, upon a suggestion of very cruel usage."83 Unwilling to
look into the question of fault, the Chancellor stated: "I can do no more in this
case than Lord Chancellor King did in the case of Colemore and Colemore."
8 4
Accordingly, the court ruled that the wife's pre-marital assets should be
"secured to her to be paid out of her own fortune."8 5 The Chancellor appointed
a special master to assess these pre-marital assets and place what remained "in
specie of capital and principal money arising out of such estate and effects" in
the hands of a trustee.86 The Chancellor further decreed that the wife was enti-
tled to the interest arising on that trust until her husband found it "proper to re-
turn and maintain her as he ought."87 Moreover, the wife was to recover the
sum of £1,700, the principal from the bond, from the husband's estate. The
wife had failed to protect her assets from her first marriage by putting them in
trust; nonetheless, the court stepped in and identified those assets which consti-
tuted her separate property and created a separate estate for her to use while liv-
ing apart from her husband.
In cases of physical abuse, Chancery also tended to grant requested relief
and support a wife's right to separate property. The court defined cruelty as
"extreme and repeated" physical abuse. 8 The leading case in this context was
82. Watkyns v. Watkyns, (1740) 26 Eng. Rep. 460 (Ch.) 460; 2 Atk. 96, 96.
83. Id.




88. STONE, supra note 70, at 198. Stone mentions that "[i]n canon law before the late eighteenth
century, only physical cruelty was taken into account, and that had to be unjustified, extreme and repeat-
ed." Id.; see also R.H. HELMHOLZ, MARRIAGE LITIGATION IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 106 (1974) (stating
that under canon law "[o]ne had to prove cruelty by concrete acts").
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Oxenden v. Oxenden, in which the wife brought a portion of £12,000 to the
marriage.89 The articles of marriage allotted £6,000 to the husband upon mar-
riage, with a £1,000 yearly annuity for jointure, and another £6,000 to be in-
vested in lands to the husband for life, then to the wife in trust to increase her
jointure, and the remainder to any children.90 The marriage was an unhappy one
and the wife was forced to separate from her husband on account of "his cruel
usage."9 1 Because the wife's family never transferred the second £6,000 to the
husband, the wife filed a bill for specific performance of the marriage articles
and to obtain separate maintenance from that second sum. The husband filed a
cross bill to have the second £6,000 "invested in a purchase, and until a pur-
chase found, to be placed at interest, on security, or on some of the public
funds."92 The court concluded that "[t]he ill treatment of the lady being fully
proved,' 93 the second £6,000 was to be placed in trust and the wife was to re-
ceive the income as her separate maintenance. This arrangement was to remain
in force "until there should be a cohabitation."94 The court created a separate
estate by identifying pre-marital property belonging to the wife and her family
and using this sum to create a trust that benefitted the wife, recovering her pre-
marital assets and allowing her to be self-sustaining.
Six years later in Nicholls v. Danvers, a wife who had sustained cruelty at
the hands of her husband obtained a similar result.95 It was proved that the hus-
band "acted with severity and cruelty towards his wife," and the court devised a
remedy in the form of the separate estate.96 After the marriage, the wife had in-
herited £3,000 from her mother's estate. At the time she inherited this money,
the marriage was already suffering due to the husband's cruelty. The wife's bill
in Chancery was a request to keep this inheritance "for her own use for her
maintenance."97 Her husband filed a cross bill claiming his right to the money.
Because of the husband's cruelty, the court dismissed his bill and decreed that
the £3,000 was to be placed in a trust to pay out interest for the wife's separate
maintenance.
Citing both Oxenden and Nicholls, Williams v. Callow was another case in
which the "husband proved drunken, rude, and abusive to his wife, and wasting
his stock.' '98 The husband brought a bill to set aside the release of his wife's
portion, which had been placed in the hands of a trustee, and the wife brought a
89. Oxendcn v. Oxenden, (1705) 23 Eng. Rep. 916 (Ch.) 916; 2 Vern. 493, 493.
90. Id.




95. Nicholls v. Danvers, (1711) 23 Eng. Rep. 1037 (Ch.); 2 Vern. 671.
96. Id. at 1037; 2 Vern. at 671.
97. Id.
98. Williams v. Callow, (1717) 23 Eng. Rep. 1091 (Ch.) 1091; 2 Vcrn. 752, 752.
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cross bill to have the interest of her portion turned into her separate state and
maintenance. The court, finding that the husband "has wasted all, and has no
fixed habitation, but goes from alehouse to alehouse," decreed separate mainte-
nance for the wife and dismissed the husband's bill. 99 While the wife's proper-
ty-her portion-had not been placed in trust specifically for her use upon
marriage, the court did not hesitate to identify this sum as being the wife's sep-
arate property nor did the court hesitate to direct income from this property to
support the wife.
In all these cases, restrictions on the judicially created separate estate
meant that the trusts provided income for married women who had been aban-
doned or abused but generally did not grant the power of appointment. The
women, therefore, did not necessarily have the ability to invade or direct prin-
cipal. Nonetheless, these judicially created separate estates still provided great
benefit to a married woman by recovering her pre-marital property and allow-
ing her to maintain a certain standard of living. Ultimately, wives who had been
subject to abusive treatment by their husbands were able to live apart from their
husbands thanks to separate estate income.
2. Tolerance for Spouses Living Apart
Even when wives were not abandoned or severely abused, marital separa-
tion was increasingly common in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries due
to shifts in marriage regulation. Full divorce or total separation with permission
to remarry was only available through an Act of Parliament. 00 The private Act
was available to a husband provided he could prove his wife's adultery, but this
option was an expensive and time-consuming process,10 neither accessible to
the general populace nor suitable for a spouse who had no title and few assets
to protect. 12 The most common method for obtaining a legal separation, there-
99. Id. at 1092; 2 Vein. at 753.
100. BAKER, supra note 3, at 565 (noting that there was "no escape from [the contract of matrimo-
ny] if it proved unsatisfactory"). A divorce via an act of Parliament was a divorce a vinculo, from the
bond, as opposed to ecclesiastical divorce a mensa et thoro, from bed and board. Id.; see also Sybil
Wolfram, Divorce in England 1700-1857, 5 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 155, 155 (1985).
101. BAKER, supra note 3, at 565. When a divorce petition reached Parliament, the "main burden of
the investigation" fell on a committee of law lords that included the Lord Chancellor. STONE, supra note
70, at 323. The reading of the bill before the law lords took on "the form of a full trial," with witnesses,
questioning, and cross-examination. Id. The bill received a vote in the Committee of Lords and, if it sur-
vived, it went to the House of Commons, where it was read before the nine-member "Select Committee
on Divorce Bills" and put to another vote. Id.
102. BAKER, supra note 3, at 564-65; see also Wolfram, supra note 100, at 158-66. Between 1700
and 1749, only fourteen divorces were granted through the Parliamentary Act, a number that under-
scores the exclusivity of this procedure. Wolfram, supra note 101, at 157. With respect to expenses, be-
cause the private Act allowed the husband to keep any money that had come to him through a marriage
settlement or that he had allocated to his wife for household expenses during the time of marriage, Par-
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fore, was the divorce a mensa et thoro. A husband or wife obtained this type of
divorce by bringing suit in ecclesiastical court.103 A decree allowed husband
and wife to live apart, and awarded alimony based on factors including fault.
Either spouse could apply to the spiritual court for this type of divorce on the
grounds of "adultery, life-threatening cruelty, or a combination of both."
10
4
Chancery, however, became deeply involved with marriage during the In-
terregnum, when the government closed the spiritual courts.10 5 Because of the
"failure of the Commonwealth or Protectorate to put anything in place [of the
ecclesiastical court system]"'10 6 and because of Chancery's history of contract
and trust regulation, Chancery took jurisdiction in many cases concerning mari-
tal matters. Furthermore, in the absence of the spiritual courts, private separa-
tion agreements "sprang up in the 1650s as a response to the administrative
chaos during the Interregnum."'' 0 7 Because there were no real court costs or le-
gal fees, deeds of separation were "popular as a very cheap way of terminating
all marriages."'1 8 Judicial separation remained preferable in the case in which
the husband could prove adultery, because he would escape alimony or annuity
payments;0 9 but for a wife, a private agreement guaranteed her an income
without the burden of court proceedings and the need to prove adultery or cru-
elty in order to obtain a decree."10 Chancery, again because of contract ques-
tions, was also the appropriate forum for claims concerning these private
agreements.
In cases of marital separation without "good cause"-i.e. abandonment or
extreme cruelty-the court was confronted with difficult legal questions that
implicated marriage policy. Chancery sometimes chose to limit a couple's free-
dom to separate without cause by providing only narrow support for a wife's
right to separate maintenance or payments from her separate estate. Additional-
ly, Chancery promoted reconciliation by enforcing only the payment of arrears
liament customarily ordered the husband to pay an annuity for life to the wife, regardless of her guilt.
STONE, supra note 70, at 345.
103. For a general discussion of ecclesiastical jurisdiction and marriage regulations, see I R.H.
HELMHOLZ, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 521-64 (2004).
104. STONE, supra note 70, at 192. One advantage of bringing suit in the ecclesiastical court for the
husband was that, if he could prove adultery, the court would not secure an annuity to the wife or grant
alimony. If the wife eloped, "she even lost her common law right to dower." Id. at 193. The wife was,
however, entitled to keep any property or assets held in a separate estate for her benefit. The wife also
kept her jointure-evcn if she had been adulterous-because the marriage remained legally intact and
therefore the settlement was still binding. Id.
105. See BAKER, supra note 3, at 152 ("In 1641 the Long Parliament abolished the High Commis-
sion and the criminal jurisdiction of other ecclesiastical courts; much of the civil jurisdiction also disap-
pearcd during the Interregnum.").
106. STONE, supra note 70, at 149.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 159.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 160.
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when there was a breach of the separation agreement. Nonetheless, Chancery
did enable wives to live apart from their husbands-and granted them financial
support to do so-when conflict between the spouses was evident.
The 1737 case of Moore v. Moore is exemplary in this respect.'l ' In that
case, the wife had a separate estate that her husband settled on her upon mar-
riage and that provided her with a yearly annuity of £ 100. Specifically, the hus-
band had, in consideration of her £6,000 portion, "conveyed lands to trustees
for 99 years, upon trust to pay out of the rents £100 a year, tax free, by half
yearly payments."112 The marriage nonetheless suffered from "continual quar-
rels between the plaintiff and the defendant about the pin-money."' 3 The hus-
band and wife accused each other of cruel behavior, and the husband treated his
wife as "a cypher in his family,"' 114 to the point of depriving her of "even the
respect due to her from his servants."' 15 Unable to tolerate living with her hus-
band any longer, the wife fled to France and, through her trustees, brought a
suit to recover the "great arrears of the annuity due."' 1
6
In response to the wife's motion, the husband filed a bill "complaining of
his wife's withdrawing herself' and claimed that her right to the annuity was
conditional on cohabitation.' 17 He offered to pay the annuity if she returned
home and he agreed to "receive her kindly, and forgive what is past.""'8 Em-
phasizing his forgiveness, the husband requested that he "be relieved against
the payment of the annuity"''119 and that he be awarded an injunction to stay the
ejectment proceedings. 120
The Chancellor was sympathetic to a wife who had been cruelly treated:
"That a woman is justifiable in deserting her husband, where he uses her with
cruelty, cannot be disputed."' 12 1 The Chancellor also, however, showed concern
about decreeing separate maintenance, stating that "separate maintenances are
not to encourage a wife to leave her husband, whatever his behavior may be;
for, was this the construction, it would destroy the very end of the marriage
contract, and be a public detriment."' 122 Expressing hesitation, the Chancellor
observed: "I am afraid these separate provisions do often occasion the very
111. Moore v. Moore, (1737) 26 Eng. Rep. 174 (Ch.) 174; 1 Atk. 273,273.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 176; 1 Atk. at 275.
114. Id.
115. Id.




120. Id. In addition to his bill in Chancery, the husband also brought suit in the ecclesiastical court
for restitution of conjugal duty. When his wife failed to appear, the court excommunicated her. Id. at
177; 1 Atk. at 277.
121. Id. at 176; 1 Atk. at 276.
122. Id.
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evils they are intended to prevent."' 123 In the wife's favor, however, the Chan-
cellor was skeptical of both the timing of the husband's bill and his desire to
reconcile, since he had made no application to his wife for her return. For these
reasons, despite a stated desire to avoid the "public detriment"'24 of broken
marriages, the court denied the husband's bill and ordered him to pay the an-
nuity arrears due on the separate state, thereby providing financial support for
the wife to continue living in France by herself.
Chancery's support for marital separation did, however, have its limits.
Three years later, in Vane v. Vane, the court addressed a situation in which
there were allegations of cruelty but the couple had also privately contracted to
create a separation agreement.25 As in Moore, Lady Vane had a separate estate
that had been created for her benefit upon marriage: "[I]n Consideration of a
Fortune of £6000, Lord Vane made a Settlement upon her of a Rent-charge of
£1500 per Ann. by way of Jointure, and of a Rent-charge of £400 per Ann. for
her separate Use during the Coverture."'126 When the husband and wife decided
to live separately, they drafted an agreement hat gave Lady Vane £700 annual-
ly in rent over and above the amount to which she was entitled through the
terms of the marriage settlement. In return, she agreed to relinquish property
rights to their house in Grosvenor Square.127
The couple reconciled briefly after the execution of the separation agree-
ment but the reconciliation ended abruptly when the husband became enraged
with his wife and "took a hot Poker out of the Fire, ran it at her, and burnt her
Clothes."'128 Worried, once they separated again, that his wife was going to
bring a bill to recover money owed pursuant to their agreement, the husband
sought an injunction from Chancery. Setting the stage, the Chancellor stated:
This Court has given Countenance to Agreements for separate Mainte-
nances .... However the Court has generally been cautious to prevent
an improper Use from being made of them. And therefore where
Agreements have been made for Pin-Money, or separate Maintenance,
if the Wife refuses to live with her Husband without having a sufficient
Reason for doing so, the Court always refuses to aid her in the Recov-
ery of such Maintenance, and in some Cases has even stopp'd it ....
nothing can be more mischievous to the Rights of Marriage than to
123. Id. at 177; 1 Atk. at 277.
124. Id. at 176; 1 Atk. at 276.
125. Vane v. Vane, (1740) 27 Eng. Rep. 585 (Ch.); Barn. C. 135.
126. Id.
127. Id. In addition, a clause in the agreement specified: "[N]o Action was to be brought on any
Account whatsoever against the Person with whom [Lady Vane] should cohabit." Id. at 586; Barn. C. at
135. The Chancellor quickly concluded that this clause violated public policy, stating: "Should this
Clause prevail, a Husband is to give up his whole Authority over his Wife," and that "this was a shame-
ful Clause, and a manifest Imposition upon the Husband." Id.
128. Id.
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support these Sort of Provisions for Pin-Money or separate Mainte-
nance, where a Wife will take Advantage of that, and live separately
from her Husband without any Reason.
The Chancellor noted that, in the case at hand, an attempt had been made
on the wife's life and so there was a possible justification for the separation.
Nonetheless, the court granted the husband's requested relief with respect to
any income due on the private agreements and enjoined Lady Vane from at-
tempting recovery. The court also indemnified the husband against any of the
debts contracted by Lady Vane during their separation. Importantly, however,
the court would not extend the injunction to the annuity deriving from Lady
Vane's separate estate.130 Consequently, Lady Vane would continue to receive
the income from her separate estate. The court thereby demonstrated that the
safest property for a wife was her separate estate, the proceeds from which the
court would not disturb.
Similar limits emerged in Head v. Head (1745). While the husband pro-
fessed he felt "a great affection"131 for his wife, he claimed that she was men-
tally ill and therefore he did not want "to be a witness of her infirmities."
132
Consequently, the husband asked his father-in-law to take his daughter into her
old family home and agreed to allow her £100 a quarter while she was living
there.133 When the husband did not pay as agreed, the wife presented a bill to
Chancery "against her husband to establish her separate maintenance, pursuant
to an agreement for that purpose."'1 34 She presented a second bill requesting
payment of the £600-the amount that was due to her on account of her hus-
band being a year and a half in arrears-in order to provide for her maintenance
until the first bill came before the court.
The court directed that £400 be paid to the wife rather than the full £600
requested, subtracting arrears that came due during a period in which the hus-
band professed to be "very desirous of cohabiting with [his wife]." 13 5 The
Chancellor reminded the parties that "[t]here are instances where ... upon the
circumstance of the husband's consenting to cohabit with [his wife], and prom-
ising to use her kindly, the court have refused to continue the separate mainte-
nance."' 136 Conceding that there was spousal conflict, the Chancellor suggested
that, although the wife was not necessarily "justified in living separate from her
129. Id. at 587; Barn. C. at 139.
130. Id.
131. Head v. Head, (1745) 26 Eng. Rep. 972 (Ch.) 972; 3 Atk. 295, 295.
132. Head v. Head, (1745)26 Eng. Rep. 1115 (Ch.) 1117; 3 Atk. 551,558.
133. There was also evidence that the husband had attempted to forcibly institutionalize the wife by
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husband,"137 it was reasonable to let them live apart "for some time, till their
passions might be supposed to subside, and they had a prospect.., to live hap-
pily together."'
138
When the bill to establish a separate maintenance ultimately came before
Chancery two years after the grant of interim support, the court found the hus-
band's proof of his desire to have the wife return home convincing. "Even sup-
posing he had beat her," the court remarked, this was no bar to reconciliation,
"for he may repent."139 Accordingly, the court's tolerance for marital separation
had boundaries and the prospect of reconciliation sometimes trumped mis-
treatment at the hands of the husband. The court's decision also underscored
that a separate estate stablished at marriage was a more secure property right
than a judicially created trust for separate maintenance, because a wife had al-
most guaranteed access to the income and the ability to enforce arrears.
Chancery's support for a wife's right to her separate property was, there-
fore, somewhat dependent on the level of abuse she could allege and the pro-
spect of reconciliation. In this respect, Chancery's separate estate jurisprudence
was conservative in its approach and hewed close to the established public pol-
icy of marriage promotion. On the other hand, Chancery's willingness to hear
these separate state cases, recognize the wife as a litigant apart from her hus-
band, and support the separate estate as a trust form provided material benefit
to wives seeking recourse from absent husbands and abusive marriages. More-
over, while judicially created separate estate trusts were often more restricted
and less secure than separate estates created by family members, these judicial-
ly created separate estates still filled an important role by provisioning abused
and unhappy wives, facilitating a certain standard of living, and financially en-
abling marital separation.
B. Creditor Claims and Divided Household Interests
A second major set of separate estate cases concerned the ability of the
wife's separate estate to act as a creditor with respect to her husband as well as
the rights of a creditor to recover from a wife's separate estate. These separate
estate cases turned on questions about whether a husband owed money to his
wife when he drew upon assets in her separate estate or charged purchases
against the estate. Similarly, questions arose concerning the extent to which a
wife could make her separate estate liable for her or her husband's expenses.
These types of claims arose both during the marriage and also after the death of
137. Head v. Head, (1745) 26 Eng. Rep. 972 (Ch.) 973; 3 Atk. 295, 296.
138. Id.
139. Head v. Head, (1747) 27 Eng. Rep. 863 (Ch.) 864; 1 Ves. Sen. 18, 19. The court added that if
"within a month she does not come home; .. . let the payment of the arrears be stopped." Id. at 864; 1
Ves. Sen. at 27.
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the wife, in the context of will challenges and estate accounting. As with the
marital separation cases, Chancery was sensitive to the policy questions em-
bedded in these legal claims and promoted marriage protection as well as judi-
cial paternalism. Nonetheless, despite Chancery's promotion of marriage in its
jurisprudence, married women were still allowed to bring claims, act as liti-
gants, and assert economic interests apart from their husbands. Accordingly,
these cases underscore the separate estate's utility in allowing a wife to protect
her and her family's assets from spendthrift husbands.
1. The Separate Estate as Creditor and Debtor
Even though the husband generally did not have rights or access to the
wife's separate estate, he was still sometimes able to use it to his benefit by
borrowing money from his wife or by using her separate estate as collateral and
raising money against the assets in trust. Once the husband successfully
charged debt to the wife's estate, the question before the court then became
how to characterize the rights of the wife's separate estate as a creditor.
A leading case was the 1714 case, Tate v. Austin, in which the wife used
£400 from her estate to "equip [her husband] as an officer in the army." 140 The
court held that when the "wife subjects her estate to supply the wants of her
husband, it must be taken to be a debt due from the husband, and to be paid out
of his personal estate, if he be able; but all other debts shall be first paid.''141
The rule that developed subsequently from Tate v. Austin was that a wife's sep-
arate estate could act as a creditor and attempt recovery against a husband who
had used the wife's separate property (albeit as the last creditor in line). The
court in Lewis v. Nangle therefore stated: "That where the husband borrows a
sum of money for his own use, and the wife joins in a mortgage of her jointure
for repayment of it, that her estate shall be a creditor on the husband for that
sum." 142
In Kinnoul v. Money, the Chancellor reaffirmed this rule, stating in very
strong terms that when a husband used his wife's estate as collateral to raise
money, the Chancellor would consider "them as two persons, and... dissolve[]
the marriage, quoad (for the duration a0) the transaction."'143 Because each
spouse would be held responsible for his or her own debts when creditors came
140. Tate v. Austin, (1714) 23 Eng. Rep. 1047 (Ch.) 1047; 2 Vern. 689, 689.
141. Id.
142. Lewis v. Nangle, (1752) 27 Eng. Rep. 97 (Ch.) 98; Amb. 150, 150. In that case, the property
interest at stake was the wife's jointure, not a trust or separate estate. However, the principle remained
the same so that the wife's jointure was not liable for a husband's debts.
143. Kinnoul v. Money, (1767) 36 Eng. Rep. 830 (Ch.) 836; 3 Swans 202, 217. In another case,
however, Lord Thurlow remarked that "[als to Lord Camden 's observation, that the marriage was dis-
solved quoad the transaction, that, perhaps, is merely figurative, as 1 know of no case to that extent."
Clinton v. Hooper, (1791) 29 Eng. Rep. 490 (Ch.) 495; 3 Bro. C.C. 201, 213.
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calling, the court expended both time and energy inquiring into the nature of
the debt and disentangling the wife's debts from those of her husband. The wife
possessed some lands that came to her from her mother and, before her mar-
riage, she had settled those assets in a separate estate "to trustees for 99 years to
secure £200 a year pin-money."44 After the separate state was created, but be-
fore her marriage, the wife used the separate estate to procure a loan to pay
some family debts; after the marriage, the couple had further occasion to raise
money on the separate estate in order to provide money to pay the husband's
debts, such that £8000 (including interest) was ultimately owed to the estate by
both the wife alone and the wife and husband acting as a couple.
In the wife's will, she devised part of her estate to her husband for life,
stating that his inheritance was "subject to such encumbrances"'145 as existed.
Having no children, the wife left other parts of her estate to family relations.
When the wife died, her husband, the Earl of Kinnoul, brought a bill requesting
the right to sell part of the estate as well as to procure contributions from the
other heirs to his wife's estate in order to satisfy the debt raised on the estate.
One dispositive question was whether the husband was solely responsible for
the debt. If the husband were solely responsible, he would be obligated to pay it
all out of his share of the estate. If, however, the court determined that some of
the debt belonged to the wife alone, other heirs to her estate would then be lia-
ble for the money owed to the estate.
Defense counsel, trying to ascribe responsibility to the husband alone, ar-
gued that when money is borrowed by husband and wife on the wife's estate,
that money is for the husband's use until proof is made to the contrary.146 Plain-
tiff counsel argued that this rule applied only when the debt was not of "mixed
nature,"147 meaning that although the husband was liable for a portion of the
debt, the wife alone was liable for the other portion, creating "mixed" liability.
Consequently, the Chancellor recommended a master to "inquire into the appli-
cation of the money" and discover details about who was liable for what part of
the total debt. 1
48
Upon receiving the Master's report, the Chancellor decreed that the wife
had been the principal debtor with respect to approximately £2734 of the debt
and the husband for the remaining sum of £5266.14 The Chancellor discharged
the husband from the wife's debt; held that the husband, as a tenant for life,
was not within his right to sell the estate; and referred the rest of the matter
back to the master to determine what was both due to and owed by the defend-
144. Kinnoul, 36 Eng. Rep at 836; 3 Swans at 203.
145. Id. at 830; 3 Swans at 202.
146. Id. at 833; 3 Swans at 202.
147. Id. at 834; 3 Swans at 203.
148. Id. at 836; 3 Swans at 218.
149. Id. at 837; 3 Swans at 220.
2014]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
ants. Significantly, the court treated the husband and wife as separate individu-
als with respect to liability, rather than treating them as an inseparable unit.
This type of reasoning-considering a marriage as a "mixed interest" proposi-
tion-struck at the heart of coverture.
As with any rule, however, there were exceptions. Consequently, even
though the general rule, stated in cases like Tate, Lewis, and Kinnoul, was that a
woman's separate estate could stand as creditor in respect to the husband, the
circumstances of individual cases often made recovery difficult for the wife.
Sometimes, it was unclear whether the sum of money given to the husband was
a gift or a loan. In Parteriche v. Powlet, for example, the wife had a separate
estate created by the terms of her marriage settlement.150 Because her husband
"had an encumbrance upon his estate, the wife advanced money to pay it
off.' 15 1 The question presented to Chancery was whether the money transferred
from the wife's estate to satisfy the husband's debt was a loan or a gift. 152 Were
the advance a loan, the wife, "having a separate estate, must be considered as a
distinct person, and is equally entitled to stand in the place of the mortgagee as
a stranger."'153 Had the transfer been meant as a gift, the outcome would have
been the opposite. The case was referred back to the master to determine which
it was.
Likewise an exception existed if it was apparent that the husband had used
money from the wife's separate estate to pay for household expenses. In that
case, the outcome was generally favorable for the husband. In Squire v. Dean, a
husband "received the dividends" of his wife's separate estate and "applied
them to the general purposes of the family."' 154 When the husband died, the
wife's trustees requested an accounting from the husband's estate to identify
expenses that the wife's estate would have been able to charge to her husband's
estate. The court refused, holding that when a husband used the funds toward
household expenses, he did not owe a debt to the wife's estate.
150. Parterichc v. Powlct, (1742)26 Eng. Rep. 632 (Ch.); 2 Atk. 383,384.
151. Id.at633;2Atk.at384.
152. At common law, gifts between husbands and wives were not possible. See I BLACKSTONE,
supra note 68, at 343 n.45 ("[A] feme covert is incapable of taking any thing of the gift of her hus-
band."). The court analyzed this issue in Clinton v. Hooper, where a wife mortgaged her estate to raise
money for her husband and brought a bill "to have her estate exonerated by the estate of her husband."
(1791) 214 Eng. Rep. 490 (Ch.) 490; 3 Bro. C.C. 201, 201. The husband claimed that the money from
the wife's estate was "a voluntary gift ... in order to enable him to complete the purchase, which had
been made at her request." Id. at 490; 3 Bro. C.C. at 202. The wife's counsel argued that he money had
not been a gift and that the case resembled Tate and Lewis, in which the rule was "where the wife's in-
heritance is mortgaged for the debt of the husband, she shall be a creditor upon the husband's assets to
the amount." Id. Because there was only parol evidence brought forward to support the plaintiff's case,
however, the Chancellor dismissed the bill without deciding whether the money had been a gift or a
loan. Id. at 496; 3 Bro. C.C. at 214.
153. Parteriche, 26 Eng. Rep. at 633; 2 Atk. at 384.
154. Squire v. Dean, (1793) 29 Eng. Rep. 916 (Ch.) 916; 4 Bro. C.C. 326, 326.
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A final exception was when a wife's separate income was characterized as
pin money, the regular allowance or settled annuity that a husband provided his
wife to buy clothing and accessories. If the court determined that the separate
estate was pin money, then the normal rules of estate accounting did not apply
and a wife usually could not recover money owed from her husband. Pin mon-
ey was sometimes held in the form of a separate estate trust and sometimes not,
which created confusion because different rules attached depending on whether
the pin money was characterized as a "true" separate estate or as a general al-
lowance that was not in trust form. Pin money, even when it was not held in
trust form, was reserved for the wife's sole use as with a separate estate. How-
ever, regardless of how the assets were held, pin money differed from a tradi-
tional separate estate in that the wife was obligated to spend the money on
"personal apparel, decoration, and ornament,"155 attiring herself according to
her husband's rank and taste.
Peacock v. Monk, from 1750, illustrates the problems that could arise when
a wife's separate estate was considered to be pin money.156 In Peacock, the
wife had income allotted to her by agreement with her husband, an admiral who
was often at sea and reliant on his wife to conduct household management. Af-
ter the wife died, the husband sold some of her effects before he died. The
wife's estate requested an accounting from the husband's estate in order to en-
sure that all the debts charged to the wife's estate were proper and to recover
any arrears. Chancery held that, "in the case of pin-money, [the accounting
may] never carry back beyond the year."'157 The aim of the court was to "pre-
vent such accounts between husband and wife."' 158 The court considered the
daily give and take of domestic accounting inappropriate for retrospective cal-
culation when the wife's income was merely "allowance" and did not want to
encourage one spouse to keep a ledger of claims against the other.
Aside from these cases conceming the wife's right to act as a creditor,
there were also cases concerning the right of the wife to make her own separate
estate liable for debts with respect to third parties. These cases further defined
the permissible actions a wife could take with respect to her property. The gen-
eral rule with respect to third-party creditors was that, "having held that a wife
might have separate estate, it was but just that the court should bind her to the
extent of making that estate liable for her debts, and so it has accordingly been
155. Jodrell v. Jodrell, (1815) 50 Eng. Rep. 259 (Ch.) 259; 9 Beav 45, 45; see also 2 GEORGE
SPENCE, THE EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY 500 (London, William Stevens
1846) (stating "it is her duty to apply it, as it is intended, for her own personal dress, decoration, and
ornament; the husband as well as the wife has an interest in its being properly applied.").
156. Peacock v. Monk, (1750) 28 Eng. Rep. 123 (Ch.); 2 Ves. Sen. 190.
157. Id. at 123; 2 Ves. Sen. at 190.
158. Id.
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settled.' 59 Even though a married woman was unable to contract at common
law, 16 Chancery would act "on the implied intent ... [and] decree a satisfac-
tion by the trustees out of her separate property including the rents of her sepa-
rate real estate."'
61
Norton v. Turvill was one of the first cases in which the court affirmed that
a wife's separate estate was liable for her debts. 162 A wife conveyed an estate to
her separate use before her marriage and with the approval of her intended hus-
band. After the marriage, she "borrowed £25 upon her bond," and when she
died the bondholder brought a bill against the executors of her estate to recover
the sum.16 3 The husband and the executors argued that the wife's bond was
void. Chancery, however, held that when a wife "having a separate estate, bor-
rows money and gives a bond; the separate estate [is] liable."'
164
In Clerk v. Miller, a wife in possession of a separate estate commissioned
workers to perform repairs and improvements to the couple's house "without
[the husband's] directions '  and with "promises to pay [the workers].' 66
When the wife died, the creditors brought a bill in Chancery to recover money
from the wife's separate estate. Similarly, in the 1792 case of Master v. Fuller,
the wife entered into an agreement with her landlord to secretly pay him money
from the proceeds of her separate estate in addition to what her husband paid
for rent "in consideration of the house being differently fitted up."'167 After the
wife's death, the husband discovered the arrangement and brought a bill to re-
cover the money his wife had used from her separate property, claiming the
agreement was fraudulent because it had been entered into without the consent
of the husband. The court charged the separate estate.
These creditor cases demonstrate that women received benefit from their
separate estates because the wife's separate estate could act as a creditor with
respect to the husband. Judicial support for these claims prohibited the husband
from treating his wife's separate estate as his personal property-as otherwise
allowed by coverture-and taking financial advantage of his wife. Moreover,
the separate estate was important because it allowed the court to construe the
wife as an autonomous economic actor and hold her responsible for her own
debts. This may not have been of immediate benefit o women, especially those
trying to avoid creditors. Nonetheless, the recognition of women as purchasers
159. 1 SPENCE, supra note 58, at 597.
160. See I BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *442-45.
161. 2 SPENCE, supra note 155, at 514.
162. Norton v. Turvill, (1723) 24 Eng. Rep. 674 (Ch.); 2 P. Wins. 144.
163. Id. at 674; 2 P. Wins. at 144.
164. Id.
165. Clerk v. Miller, (1742) 26 Eng. Rep. 629 (Ch.) 629; 2 Atk. 379, 379.
166. Id.
167. Master v. Fuller, (1792) 29 Eng. Rep. 757 (Ch.) 757; 4 Bro. C.C. 19, 19.
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and debtors undermined the state of coverture by granting them legal agency
with respect to their separate property.1
68
2. "Kicking or Kissing" a Wife 's Separate Estate from Her
Another question that troubled Chancery was what resulted when a wife
voluntarily chose to give assets from her separate estate to her husband. In
some cases, the husband and wife had a happy and successful marriage, and the
exchange was mutually beneficial. In assessing exchanges and transactions be-
tween spouses, however, Chancery recognized the danger of an imbalance in
bargaining power between a wife and her husband. The fear was that a husband
could "kiss or kick" a wife's separate property from her.169 Despite these pater-
nalist concerns and the fear of coercion, Chancery generally upheld a wife's
right to direct income from her separate estate to benefit her husband. These
affirmations of a women's right to direct her separate estate income and assets
demonstrated support for a wife's economic agency.
For example, in a case where the trustees tried to stop a wife from giving
separate estate assets to the husband, the court sided with the wife. In Ellis v.
Atkinson, the plaintiff wife was possessed of a separate estate of £2000 that had
been settled to her upon marriage.170 The wife entered into an agreement to
give over the income from her estate to her husband and brought a bill against
the trustees when they would not execute the agreement. The trustees ques-
tioned whether the wife could so direct her property, especially because the
trust was established to "protect her against the debts of her husband."'71 The
Chancellor held it was "in the absolute power of the wife"'17 2 to direct income
to her husband, and, because "it was evidently her pleasure to give it to her
husband, he did not see how he could prevent her."'
173
Similarly, in Pawlet v. Delaval, the court characterized the wife's conver-
sion of her separate estate into liquid assets to give her husband as a valid exer-
cise of power. 174 In that case, the wife was possessed of a separate estate of
£23,000 derived from an inheritance from her mother. The trust, intended for
the wife's sole and separate use, did not contain any conditions on its use. The
wife, acting with the approval of the trustees, decided to convert the separate
estate into assets for her and her husband's joint use. Subsequently, the husband
died and the assets became a part of his estate. The wife soon remarried, and
168. For a discussion of married women and creditors under coverture, see James Oldham, Credi-
tors and the Feme Covert, in LAW AND LEGAL PROCESS 217 (M. Dyson and D. lbbetson eds., 2013).
169. SPRING, supra note 8, at 115.
170. Ellis v. Atkinson, (1792) 21 Eng. Rep. 466 (Ch.); Dickens 759.
171. Id. at 466; Dickens at 760.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Pawlet v. Dclaval, (1750) 28 Eng. Rep. 422 (Ch.); 2 Ves. Sen. 663.
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she and her second husband brought a bill, requesting that Chancery set aside
the deeds by which the wife had ended her separate estate.
The Chancellor began by stating that it was "the duty of this court to pro-
tect afeme covert from any inadvertent act of hers, and not to presume she in-
tended to part with that property." 175 For this reason, the court was "careful to
prevent her affection and obsequiousness, or her fears, from operating to her
prejudice."' 176 The Chancellor, however, found "no pretence of any compulsion,
fraud or imposition .... ,,177 Rather, the Chancellor remarked that the couple
"lived in the best harmony,"'' 78 and stressed that the wife had presented no ob-
jections to divesting herself of her separate estate at any time-at the time of
the agreement, during the subsequent welve years of the first marriage, or after
the death of her husband when she was acting as executrix. As executrix, she
had settled her husband's account according to the will and never questioned
that these assets that were once her separate estate formed part of her husband's
estate. The consent of the trustees also militated in favor of the voluntariness of
the wife's signing over her estate. The Chancellor consequently dismissed the
bill.
Furthermore, although Chancery took an allegation of coercion seriously,
such an allegation did not always result in a ruling against the husband. In
Pybus v. Smith, Anna-Maria Vernon, a ward of the court, was married to
Thomas Vernon.179 Upon her marriage and "in pursuance of a decree of the
Court of Chancery," wife and husband established a separate estate consisting
of a house and its land, the rents from which were to go to the wife for her sole
and separate use.'80 The husband was a trader and, finding himself "considera-
bly in advance on his account,"' 181 came to an agreement with his bankers that
they would continue to advance him money and he would use his wife's sepa-
rate estate as security. The wife signed an agreement directing her trustees to
pay the income from her separate estate to her husband and also make available
to her husband the real estate that she held in trust.182 Relying on this agree-
ment, the husband's bankers brought a bill to recover their losses from the
wife's separate estate.
The wife argued that she had not understood the import and consequences
of the agreement at the time she signed it, and defense counsel highlighted her
innocence by reminding the court, "Mrs. Vernon was an infant, and a ward of
175. Id. at 424; 2 Vcs. Sen. at 665.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 425; 2 Vcs. Sen at 668.
178. Id. at 425; 2 Vcs. Sen at 667.
179. Pybus v. Smith, (1791) 29 Eng. Rep. 570 (Ch.); 3 Bro. C.C. 340.
180. Id. at 570; 3 Bro. C.C. at 340.
181. Id. at 571; 3 Bro. C.C. at 341.
182. Id.
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this Court, when Vernon carried her off to Scotland."'83 Defense counsel also
emphasized that the wife had not consulted with the trustees before signing the
agreement relinquishing control of her separate estate to the husband. The
plaintiff bankers, eager to be paid, "argued that a feme covert was, as to her
separate property, exactly in the same state as afeme sole."'184 The Chancellor,
who had doubts as to the wife's understanding upon entering the agreement,
ordered a master's inquiry into the circumstances of the signing. The Master,
however, found that the wife executed the agreement "freely and readily, and
that no arguments or persuasions were used, at the time of executing the said
deeds, by any person, to induce them to execute the same. '185 Accordingly, alt-
hough the Chancellor considered the wife's act "improvident, ' 86 he held for
the bankers, saying that if "afeme covert sees what she is about, the Court al-
lows of her alienation of her separate property."'
87
In the 1750 case of Grigby v. Cox, the court likewise dismissed claims of
coercion and ruled that a wife's actions with respect to her separate estate were
legally valid.188 In that case, an estate had been settled on the wife upon mar-
riage and placed in the hands of trustees who would "receive the rents and prof-
its for [the wife's] sole and separate use."'18 9 The wife sold part of her separate
estate to the plaintiff, completing the sale without consulting the trustees. When
the wife did not perform, the plaintiffs brought the bill in Chancery for specific
performance of the bargain.'90 The wife argued that her husband was in collu-
sion with the plaintiff, and that he had compelled her to sell the land. She
claimed that she executed the deal "for fear of losing her life if she refused."''9
The Chancellor, however, concluded that: "[W]here any thing is settled to
the wife's separate use, she is considered as a feme sole; may appoint in what
manner she pleases."'92 The Chancellor noted that an exception to the rule ex-
isted when "the joining of her trustees with her is made necessary," but found
that there was no requirement of trustee approval in the case at hand. 193 The
Chancellor observed that "if there is any proof that the husband had any im-
183. Id. at 572; 3 Bro. C.C. at 344. After Lord Hardwicke's Marriage Act of 1753, it was much
easier to get married in Scotland than in England. "As a border town, Gretna Green in Dumfries thrived
on the business thrown to it by the strictures of the Marriage Act of 1753, and the term 'Gretna Green
marriage' acquired a reputation similar to that of 'Las Vegas divorce'." SAMUEL P. MENEFEE, WIVES
FOR SALE: AN ETHNOGRAPHIC STUDY OF BRITISH POPULAR DIVORCE 11 (1981).
184. Pybus, 29 Eng. Rep. at 572; 3 Bro. C.C. at 344.
185. Id. at 572; 3 Bro. C.C. at 343.
186. Id. at 573; 3 Bro. C.C. at 347.
187. Id. at 573; 3 Bro. C.C. at 346.
188. Grigby v. Cox, (1750) 27 Eng. Rep. 1178 (Ch.); I Ves. Sen. 517.
189. Id. at 1178; 1 Ves. Sen. at 517.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1178; 1 Ves. Sen. at 518
193. Id.
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proper influence over the wife in it by ill, or even extraordinary good usage, to
induce her to it, the court might set it aside: but not without that."'
194
Consequently, the clearest paths for wives to recover assets from her sepa-
rate estate in the absence of extreme coercion by the husband, was a claim that
the trustees breached their fiduciary duty. Thayer v. Gould, from 1739, was
such a case. Humphrey Thayer was the trustee for the separate estate of Anne
Thayer. 95 A marriage settlement had established a trust in the amount of £2000
for the use of the husband during his life, becoming the wife's jointure upon the
husband's death.'96 Needing money, the wife and husband applied to the trus-
tees to use £ 1000 of the trust's principal, and the trustees approved. 197 The cou-
ple then came to a new agreement that the remaining £1000 of the trust assets
were to be "laid out in the purchase of an annuity, which should be for the sole
and separate use of the wife during the coverture, and in fee in case of survivor-
ship."' 98 After the couple created the separate estate for Mrs. Thayer, her hus-
band "found means to prevail upon Humphrey Thayer to pay him this £1000
likewise."'199 The husband died, without having repaid the sum to the separate
estate, leaving the "plaintiff destitute, there being no assets.,200 The wife
brought her bill against Humphrey Thayer's estate for breach of trust, and the
court ordered that the wife receive a quarterly, tax-free annuity for life out of
the husband's estate.
Similarly, in 1798, in Whistler v. Newman, the wife's separate estate had
been established, just prior to her marriage, and two trustees were appointed.2 °'
One of the trustees was an uncle and creditor of the husband. When the hus-
band needed money to pay his debts, the trustees transferred assets in the form
of stock from the wife's separate estate to the husband. Nine years later, the
husband had not repaid the money and died "insolvent[,] leaving his wife and
six children by her surviving.' 2°2 The trustees did replace the stock, approxi-
mately a year after the husband's death, but the widow brought a bill against
the trustees to recover the dividends that she would have earned had the stock
not been sold. Defense counsel contended that the stock was "sold out at her
instance and request, and with her privity, consent, and direction.,20 3 The
Chancellor, however, concluded that the trustees had taken "an active and most
194. Id.
195. Thayer v. Gould, (1739) 26 Eng. Rep. 386 (Ch.); I Atk. 615.
196. Id. at 386; 1 Atk. at 615.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 387; 1 Atk. at 616.
200. Id.
201. Whistler v. Newman, (1798) 31 Eng. Rep. 67 (Ch.); 4 Ves. Jun. 129.
202. Id. at 68; 4 Ves. Jun. 131.
203. Id.
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mischievous part.' 2°4 He remarked: "I do not recollect to a case, where the trus-
tee has stood before me, aiding the husband ruin his family."20 5 The Chancellor
thereafter ordered trustees to make restitution by paying the wife lost stock div-
idends.
Even in cases when the court failed to protect the separate estate assets,
then, Chancery did a service to married women by treating them as agentic be-
ings possessed of the right to dispose of assets according to personal choice and
not subjecting these choices to judicial revision. It is possible that Chancery ex-
tended judicial support in these cases because the husband ultimately benefit-
ted. That is, outcomes that benefitted the husband many have been more palat-
able to the court because they aligned with both coverture rules and social
norms regarding traditional marital property.20 6 Accordingly, some form of in-
terest convergence may have propelled the support for a married woman's con-
trol over her separate property. Nonetheless, the court did married women a
service by avoiding the assumption that they had no control over their actions
with respect to their separate property and supporting their right to direct the
assets in their separate estates.
C. A Wife's Right to Devise Her Separate Estate
Similar questions concerning the extent of a wife's power with respect to
her separate estate arose in the context of wills. The central question in these
cases was whether a wife had the legal right to devise her separate estate. The
general rule for a wife's devise, the Chancellor stated in Grigby v. Cox, was
that "where any thing is settled to the wife's separate use, she is considered as a
feme sole."20 7 This proposition was affirmed and clarified in cases that fol-
lowed. In another leading case, Fettiplace v. Gorges, the court clarified that a
wife did not need her husband's consent to will her separate estate when it con-
sisted specifically of various forms of personal property.208 In that case, Sophia
Fettiplace, the wife, had a separate estate, consisting of annuity income, estab-
lished for her sole and separate use by her husband upon marriage, and another
estate established by her aunt through a bequest, consisting of stock and furni-
ture. When Sophia died, she left the entirety of the combined estate to her
niece, instead of her husband, who was apparently improvident and had been
204. Id. at 70; 4 Ves. Jun. 135.
205. Id.
206. This was also true with respect to women devising their property, i.e. Chancery was support-
ive, particularly to the extent that married women's devises aligned with the family interest in maintain-
ing the family estate. See discussion infra pp. 40-42.
207. Grigby v. Cox, (1750) 27 Eng. Rep. 1178 (Ch.) 1178; 1 Ves. Sen 518, 518.
208. Fettiplace v. Gorges, (1789)29 Eng. Rep. 374 (Ch.); 3 Bro. CC. 8.
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previously "embarrassed and obliged to go abroad.''209 The husband brought a
bill in an attempt to recover the estate, claiming that his wife did not have the
power to dispose of it without his consent. 2 1 The court dismissed the bill and
affirmed that, if a wife's separate estate was solely comprised of personal prop-
erty, the wife could dispose of the estate without her husband's permission or
any other accompanying grant of authority.
2 11
But while women could clearly devise personal property, real property was
another question. In Peacock v. Monk, Chancery was faced with the question of
how to treat a married woman who tried to devise a house bought with the pro-
ceeds from her separate estate. The Chancellor began by remarking that "it is
common, that by agreement between husband and wife she has some separate
estate left for her disposal ... which she may not only use, but by the contract
may dispose of what arises out of her [separate estate], as afeme sole. , 2 12 He
proceeded, however, to qualify the rule by stating, "It is very different as to real
estate; for her real estate will descend to her heir at law." 2 13 The Chancellor
asked rhetorically, "How can a will made during [the wife's] coverture prevent
the descending to her heir at law? It is impossible.' '2 14 Mrs. Lestock's devise of
real property failed.
Questions of real property distribution arose once again in Churchill v.
Dibben. In that case, the wife, Elizabeth Dibben, left various forms of property
to her relations, including her husband, in her will. The court treated the various
forms differently, according not only to type of property but also according to
whether or not the property had been placed in trust before marriage. A portion
of the lands she devised-"some farms, & some freehold, others leasehold"-
were lands she had purchased uring coverture.2 15 The Chancellor therefore re-
iterated what Peacock v. Monk had earlier suggested:
If part of that petsonal estate is laid out in the purchase of lands,
though those lands are the fruit of, and do arise from, that separate es-
tate, there is no authority to say, she may dispose of them, for there
comes in another person, an heir at law, to be disinherited, and he can-
not be bound by any agreement of the husband.216
209. 2 R. S. DONNISON ROPER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY ARISING FROM THE
RELATION BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE, 184 (New York, Gould & Son 1824).
210. Fettiplace, 29 Eng. Rep. at 374; 3 Bro. C.C. at 8.
211. Id. at 375; 3 Bro. C.C. at 10.
212. Peacock v. Monk, (1750) 28 Eng. Rep. 123 (Ch.) 123; 2 Ves. Sen. 190, 190.
213. Id. at 124; 2 Ves. Sen. at 192.
214. Id.
215. Churchill v. Dibben, (1754) 96 Eng. Rep. 1310 (Ch.) 1311; 3 Keny. 67, 69.
216. Id. at 1316; 3 Keny. at 84.
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The Chancellor concluded, "[w]here lands are purchased after [marriage],
there is no trust, no use that can give force to an appointment of them. 217 The
heir at law was therefore entitled to inherit the freehold land that Elizabeth
Dibben had purchased with the proceeds from her separate estate while mar-
ried.
218
Apart from the lands Elizabeth Dibben had purchased during her marriage,
she was also the owner of other, substantial freehold lands that she conveyed
upon marriage to the use of herself for life and, in strict settlement, to the issue
of her marriage or, in the absence of issue, part to her husband and part to the
trustees and their heirs.2 19 Dibben also bequeathed the remainder of her "goods,
chattels, estates, and estate whatsoever undisposed of... unto [her] kinsman,
Richard Churchill, the Younger, to him, his heirs, executors, and assigns, for
ever. '22° She reserved for herself the power of appointment with respect to the-
se estates. 22' When Elizabeth died childless, Richard Churchill, her heir at law,
filed a bill to ascertain the rights of the various parties and obtain an account-
ing.
222
Addressing the question of whether the devise of these other parcels of
land was a good execution of the power, the Chancellor concluded that a mar-
ried woman possessed full authority to devise any property, including freehold
property, if she had properly conveyed the property to herself in trust prior to
marriage and reserved the power of appointment to herself.223 In Peacock, Lord
Hardwicke had speculated that, given the proper conveyance, a married woman
could direct her separate estate to the benefit of someone other than the heir at
law. 224 In Churchill, that speculation became legal conclusion.
Because the wife had conveyed the property to herself in trust and given
herself the power of appointment, the court could find no reason she did not
have the power to devise it. The Chancellor stated:
"This was originally the testatrix's own estate; she has settled it to her-
self for life, and after in strict settlement, with a power to dispose of it.
. [and] the reversion in fee was in herself, and, unless she disposed of
217. Id. at 1317; 3 Keny. at85.
218. Id. The court held the devise of the leasehold land purchased during coverture to be good,
however, passing it as personal property to her brother.
219. Id. at 1311; 3 Kcny. at 68.
220. Id. at 1311; 3 Keny. at 70.
221. Id. at 1311; 3 Kny. at 69.
222. Id. at 1311; 3 Keny. at 70.
223. Id. at 1311; 3 Keny. at 85.
224. Peacock v. Monk, (1750) 28 Eng. Rep. 123 (Ch.) 124; 2 Ves. Sen. 190, 191. ("Undoubtedly
on her marriage a woman may take such a method, that she may dispose of that real estate from going to
her heir at law; that is, she may do it without a fine; but I doubt whether it can be done but either by way
of trust or of power over a use.").
2014]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
it, would remain in her and descend to her heirs. 225 Furthermore, the
court asked "[w]hat, then, is the difference between her case and that
of a person who has a general capacity by virtue of the Statute of H.8
[The Statute of Wills]?
226
The answer was that there was indeed no difference and the devise of these
properties was consequently good. With respect to the remainder of the estate
devised to Richard Churchill, the Chancellor employed a similar logic: "[H]ad
this been the will of a person who had a general capacity to dispose of lands,..
. such lands would certainly have passed.,227 And so the remainder of the es-
tate, including a grant of £1,000 reserved for the executor, went to Richard
221Churchill.
Ten years later, Wright v. Cadogan came before Chancery. The court was
again called upon to decide whether the will of a married woman, who by mar-
riage articles had reserved to herself the power of disposing her separate estate
(which included both real and personal property), was a valid execution of the
power.229 In that case, a wife created a separate estate for herself in anticipation
of her second marriage. The wife had a jointure from her first marriage and
"great expectations of a considerable accession of fortune from several rela-
tions" that formed her separate estate, the terms of which allowed her to devise
all the property and assets in the trust.
230
The wife devised her estate to trustees, with provisions for her husband and
the children from her second marriage, and when she died, her son from the
first marriage filed a bill requesting that half the estate be conveyed to him.
231
Lord Northington held that the wife had the right to devise property-both real
232and personal-in her separate estate and denied the bill . Stating the rule and
citing Churchill, the Chancellor remarked:
"[A] woman may now antecedent to her marriage retain a power over a
legal estate of which she is seised, so as to have during the coverture a
power to dispose of it ... in the same manner as she might have done
if she had not put herself under coverture."
233
225. Dibben, 96 Eng. Rep. at 1316; 3 Keny. at 82.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 1315; 3 Keny. at81.
228. Id. at 1317; 3 Keny. at 86-87.
229. Wright v. Cadogan, (1764) 28 Eng. Rep. 890 (Ch.) 890; 2 Eden 239, 239.
230. Id. at 891; 2 Eden at 242.
231. Id. at 892; 2 Eden at 244-45.
232. Id. at 897-98; 2 Eden at 260.
233. Id. at 895; 2 Eden at 252.
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The Chancellor further added: "This has been the established doctrine es-
poused and adopted by the court, after having been controverted for a great
length of time."
234
Finally, in Rippon v. Dawding, Lord Camden ruled for the wife's right to
direct property in the case of a widow who was seised of a freehold estate and
entered into a bond with her second husband, previous to their marriage, allow-
ing her to dispose of her freehold estate by deed or will notwithstanding her
coverture. "As the Court decreed performance of the agreement in Wright v.
Lord Cadogan, which was a trust interest, it will do so in this, which is the case
of a legal interest.2 35 In a subsequent note to the opinion, the Editor remarked:
"The present case, and that of Wright v. Englefield, settled what had before
been doubted [in Peacock v. Monk]... that the husband and wife may, by mere
agreement [made in contemplation of marriage], enable the wife to dispose of
her real estate during coverture, and, thereby defeat the right of the heir after
her death.
' 236
In a matter of fifteen years, due in large part to the decision in Churchill v.
Dibben, a married woman's right to devise both real and personal property
from her separate estate became entrenched. Chancery transformed the treat-
ment of a married woman's real property by recognizing her right to devise it
when it was placed in separate trust before the marriage and the wife possessed
the power of appointment. This evolution, perhaps more than anything, demon-
strates the great benefit that the separate estate provided to married women.
That a wife could not only enjoy the income from her separate state but could
also dispose of the assets to her liking, as long as they were in trust, lends
strong support to the characterization of the separate estate as trust form that
was materially beneficial to married women.
III. A REVISED ASSESSMENT OF THE SEPARATE ESTATE
What remains is to assess the impact of these separate estate cases in order
to understand what utility the separate estate had for married women. The pre-
vailing view of the separate estate is that it was not a particularly effective ve-
hicle for extending property rights to married women.237 Susan Moller Okin has
234. Id. at 895; 2 Eden at 253.
235. Rippon v. Dawding, (1769) 27 Eng. Rep. 363 (Ch.) 364; Amb. 565, 566.
236. Id. at 365; Amb. at 566.
237. See the discussion infra in the Introduction and Part I.B. There are, nonetheless, historians
who celebrate the separate estate and Chancery's equitable interventions into married women's property
ownership. Maria Cioni has stated that "[piroviding security for married women while their spouses
were alive and permitting them to have an estate at their own disposal was a major innovation developed
in the Elizabethan Chancery." CIONI, supra note 13, at 286. Moreover, she has argued that Chancery, in
response to changing social conditions and because of legal claims from married women, developed
particular forms of equitable relief. Id. at 280.
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pointed out that a wife's right to own and control property, when held in sepa-
rate trust, was necessarily subject to control by trustees, underscoring the wife's
238lack of full capacity. In addition, because of restrictive trust terms estab-
lished by the trust settlor, the wife sometimes received trust income, but was
unable to touch the principal. Susan Staves therefore argues that "the very rules
that conferred ownership on women gave them a kind of ownership different
from that imagined in a liberal property regime-entitlement to profit from
capital, but not control over capital itself or the power to alienate capital.,
239
Moreover, Staves points out that cultural norms and expectations weighed
against women "understanding their entitlements or controlling their assets."
240
A related argument, put forth by Staves and others, is that in the case of
women's property, "private law rules ... express[ed] public ideologies"241 and
that the dominant ideology being expressed at the time was wealth preservation
for the family. Like Eileen Spring,242 Staves suggests that conventional concern
for the maximization and preservation of great estates tended to result in the
dispossession of women through the application of idiosyncratic property
243rules. According to this argument, the fact that the rules governing married
women's property were designed to accumulate and maintain great estates pre-
vented the rules from simultaneously endowing daughters and wives with eco-
nomic agency.
The conception of the separate estate as a conservative and patriarchal
form of property holding has great merit. It is undoubtedly true that idiosyn-
cratic property rules sometimes kept married women from enjoying full power
over their separate property, and that the separate estate was a useful vehicle for
preserving family wealth and great estates. Furthermore, families were certain-
ly motivated to create these trusts as much to protect against a potentially irre-
sponsible and spendthrift son-in-law as to provision the daughter, as is clear
from the standard language used in creating a separate estate.
The separate estate was, however, only as conservative or paternalistic as
the terms that created it. The terms of a trust-how it was written and what re-
strictions it contained--dictated the amount of control that a wife had over her
separate estate. In some cases, fathers or other relatives wrote restrictions into
the trust, safeguarding money by disallowing women to invade principal. How-
ever, in other cases, trust settlors created trusts that gave women full authority
over both income and principal. Furthermore, when women created separate
238. See Okin, supra note 7, at 125.
239. STAVES, supra note 8, at 222.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 196.
242. SPRING, supra note 8, at 39-65.
243. STAVES, supra note 8, at 199-208.
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estates for themselves before marriage, they generally gave themselves full au-
thority over the assets placed in trust.
The separate estate was not created nor used as a tool for female empow-
erment. Nonetheless, I propose that the separate estate was a vehicle that fur-
thered the rights and well-being of married women. In this Part, I discuss the
importance of the separate estate for married women in practical, precedential,
and theoretical terms. I discuss the material benefits that flowed to married
women from their separate estates, endowing them with economic agency. I
also discuss the importance of the separate estate in making women legal actors
and setting legal precedent for increased rights-holding. Finally, I discuss the
value of the separate estate as a tool for fracturing the unitary theory of mar-
riage.
A. Married Women as Economic Actors
On a very basic economic level, a wife's separate estate was the source of
many material benefits. Even in the absence of marital conflict, the financial
subsidy that a wife received from her separate state could only be helpful. The
separate estate provided income to the wife that was guaranteed and not de-
pendent on the largesse of her husband. Wives certainly had access to money in
forms other than the separate estate-annuities established in marriage con-
244tracts or other non-trust forms of allowance. Nonetheless, having a guaran-
teed source of income that was not reachable by a husband or his creditors add-
ed a layer of security and gave the wife some economic bargaining power
within the marriage.
Moreover, as the marital separation cases illustrate, judicially created sepa-
rate estates allowed wives to live apart from their husbands in cases of abuse,
cruelty, and other marital conflict. Chancery was tolerant, to a certain degree,
of marital separation-especially in the case of abuse-and willing to enforce
the terms of a separate estate and also to create separate estates to provide mar-
ried women with the means to support themselves. Because of these judicially
created separate estates, mistreated wives were not forced to seek public assis-
tance, live in penury, or beg for subsistence funds from their husbands. Instead
they had a modicum of income and were able to be self-supporting and eco-
nomically independent. By provisioning wives with the economic resources to
live apart from their husbands in these situations, the court provided great bene-
fit to women by allowing them to escape from unhappy and harmful marriages.
In addition, because a wife's separate estate could act as a creditor with re-
spect to the husband and recover money borrowed from or charged to the es-
244. See STAVES, supra note 8, at 132; see also ERICKSON, supra note 5, at 103-04.
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tate, these trusts were not a freely accessible source of income for the husband.
Married women had judicial recourse when their husbands mortgaged their
separate estates to raise funds, charged personal expenses against the separate
estate, or similarly misappropriated assets. In this way, the separate state pro-
vided the benefit of secure assets for married women that were not automatical-
ly under their husbands' control. All of these practical and economic benefits
flowed from a married woman's separate estate, even assuming a restrictive
trust that provided a wife with access to income alone.
Women did not just control income, however. As the cases conceming will
challenges and estate accountings demonstrate, married women did in fact have
the ability to alienate their separate estate property, and not just personal prop-
erty but also real property, as long as it had been placed in trust before mar-
riage. Wives were therefore able to choose how and to whom to transfer their
wealth. In some of the separate estate cases, wives controlled great bodies of
wealth and capital.
It is possible that Chancery supported a wife's right to dispose of property
because the testation patterns of the married women in these cases aligned with
the goal of family wealth preservation. When married women devised their
separate estates, the results did not necessarily differ from those cases in which
the wives possessed no power to devise the property. That is to say, married
women's devises in the separate estate cases followed a specific pattern, name-
ly giving assets and income back to their birth families and giving husbands a
life interest in various parts of their estates, especially when there were no chil-
dren.
In Churchill v. Dibben, Elizabeth Dibben, who died childless, left her hus-
band a life estate in certain properties but upon his death these properties re-
verted to family ownership and the land passed to her brother. Moreover, in her
will Dibben made generous gifts to her other brother, as well as a female rela-
tion from the Churchill side of the family.245 Likewise, in Kinnoul v. Money,
the husband was entitled to be a tenant by curtesy and had a life estate in cer-
tain of the wife's properties; however at his death the properties reverted back
to her relations.246 Furthermore, the wife had devised other properties to rela-
tions in her will, leaving the better part of her estate to family relations, not her
husband. In Fettiplace v. Gorges, the wife left her estate to her niece instead of
her husband, who was still alive when she died.24 7
These devises certainly support the idea that separate estate rusts were ve-
hicles for consolidating family wealth. However, the devises also support the
proposition that building family wealth and great estates did not necessarily
245. Churchill v. Dibben, (1754) 96 Eng. Rep. 1310 (Ch.) 1311; 3 Keny. 68, 69.
246. Kinnoul v. Money, (1767) 36 Eng. Rep. 830 (Ch.) 830; 3 Swans 202, 202.
247. Fettiplace v. Gorges, (1789) 29 Eng. Rep. 374 (Ch.) 374; 3 Bro. C.C. 8, 8.
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come at the expense of married women. What these testation cases suggest is
that married women, not just their fathers and male relations, had an interest in
and desire for preserving the family estate. In fact, married women appointing
their separate estates may have played an active rather than a passive part in
keeping family wealth intact.248 In this respect, the fact that women were direct-
ing and devising property through the use of the separate estate maps on to the
proposition put forth by Lloyd Bonfield that "women were empowered by the
'culture of will-making' that obtained in early-modem England.', 249 Additional-
ly, this activity lends additional support o the findings of Tim Stretton, who
has suggested that women "could, and many did, overcome the pressures of
law, society, family and kin to claim interests for themselves inside courtrooms
as well as out in the world. 250
Speaking in practical terms, then, the separate estate cases underscore that
women received economic benefit from their separate estate. Women were able
to exit bad marriages, obtain purchasing power, and help consolidate family
fortunes. Women became economic actors-some of them on acting on a
prominent stage-thanks to the assets they held in separate estates.
B. Married Women as Litigants
Commentators on equity have often repeated the maxim that "equity fol-
lows the law.' 251 In the case of a married woman's right to separate property,
equity did not necessarily follow the law. While coverture was the rule at
common law, "across the hall '252 in the Court of Chancery, a materially differ-
ent set of rules governed married women's property rights. Chancery was will-
ing, as the cases demonstrate, to treat a wife as a person apart from her hus-
band. Scholars have, consequently, made the connection between Chancery as
a legal forum and the increase in women's rights. Maria Cioni has argued that
"Chancery laid the foundations for married women's property rights, gave se-
curity to women who held real and personal estates [in trust]... and accorded a
248. Married women may still have seen themselves as embedded in an ancestry that was not ex-
tinguished upon marriage. For example, Lady Anne Clifford construed her identity in terms of her inher-
itance and her obligations to her birth family. See Carla Spivack, Law, Land, Identity: The Case of Lady
Anne Clifford, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 393, 420 (2012).
249. LLOYD BONFIELD, DEVISING, DYING, AND DISPUTE: PROBATE LITIGATION IN EARLY MODERN
ENGLAND 241 (2012). Women not only made wills, but also acted as executrices and administrators, and
served as witnesses in probate courts. Id. Amy Erickson also has documented the great frequency with
which wives acted as agents of absent husbands. ERICKSON, supra note 5, at 155-60.
250. STRETTON, supra note 12, at 154.
251. For a few representative discussions of this maxim, see 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *441 ("It is a maxim that equity follows the law."); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 40 (London, Stevens & Haynes 1884) ("In the first place it is a common
maxim, that equity follows the law, AEquitas sequitur legem."); and I SPENCE, supra note 58, at 421.
252. LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 80, at 312.
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right to separated or divorced women."253 Tim Stretton has also emphasized
that "[e]quity courts helped to protect the interests a woman wished to keep
separate from her husband" by providing "flexibility" that the common law
courts did not. 254 At a baseline level, Chancery benefitted married women by
allowing them access to courts in the capacity of litigants and evaluating their
claims on the basis of trust law-not according to coverture rules or canon law.
In so doing, Chancery not only established married women as having their own
economic interests, writing these women into legal record, but also established
a precedent-setting jurisprudence with respect to a married woman's right to
separate property.
1. Chancery as a Forum for Wives
The degree to which Chancery supported the separate economic identity of
the wife by endowing her with property rights was tied to questions of marital
reconciliation, moral behavior, household accounting, and property definition.
In none of the cases, however, did Chancery refuse to consider the wife's claim
because of coverture. Moreover, Chancery did not take up claims based on civil
marital law, as practiced in the spiritual courts.25 5 In fact, the Chancery court
was very careful not to tread too heavily on ecclesiastical jurisdiction and main-
256tained a policy of avoiding inquiry into the merits of marital disputes.
Accordingly, unlike the spiritual and common law courts, Chancery was
not overly constrained by legal rules and conventions about marital duties or
the impairment of a woman's rights within marriage. Rather, the Chancellors
defined their jurisdiction and their judicial approach to marriage against the
other courts. The controlling factor in Chancery's taking jurisdiction in these
cases was the presence of questions relating to the regulation of trusts.257 Chan-
cery had exclusive jurisdiction over the trust form because the common law, in
253. CIONI, supra note 13, at i.
254. STRETTON, supra note 12, at 27-29. Stretton also emphasizes that women were still depend-
ent on access to resources and that, while equity courts were a wife's "allies," they were not her "legal
saviour." Id. at 28.
255. Marital litigation could occur in various fora including but not limited to Chancery. For a dis-
cussion of the various fora in which women were litigants, see STRETTON, supra note 12, at 21-42. For
an overview of the spiritual courts' jurisdiction and jurisprudence, see BAKER, supra note 36, at 233-43,
and for an overview of the development of equitable jurisdiction and trust jurisprudence, see Michael
Macnair, The Conceptual Basis of Trusts in the 1 7mf and 181h Centuries, in ITINERA FIDUCIAE 211-12 (R.
Helmholz & R. Zimmerman eds., 1998).
256. In Legard v. Johnson, the Chancellor stated plainly that the "Ecclesiastical Court according to
the jurisdiction of this country has exclusive cognizance of the rights and duties arising from the state of
marriage." (1797) 30 Eng. Rep. 1049 (Ch.) 1052; 3 Ves. 352, 359. This was especially true after the
interregnum, once the church courts had been re-established and were adjudicating marital claims relat-
ing to divorce. Id.
257. LANGBEIN ETAL., supra note 80, at 311.
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its "rigidity and strictness,' '2 5 8 did not recognize trusts.2 59 Trust regulation de-
fined Chancery's powers as well as its docket. 26 In Legard, consequently, the
Chancellor stated that Chancery could rule on a separate maintenance case
"where the property is only to be sued in this jurisdiction; where a trust is cre-
ated; and there is no coming at it by the common law."
261
The categories of claims married women brought to Chancery fell "broadly
into two camps: proprietary ... and contractual.'" 2 6 2 The husband filed a claim
in Kinnoul, requesting an accounting from his wife's estate in the hope of re-
lieving some of the debt inherited with her estate.263 In Churchill, the heir at
law filed for an accounting and clarification of whether the wife's appointment
264of her property was good. In Peacock, the wife's trustee brought a bill de-
manding an accounting of expenditures from the husband's trustee after both
265spouses had died. Claims concerning the ability of a wife to devise her sepa-
rate estate also exemplified contested property interests held in trust. In
Fettiplace, the husband filed a bill "insisting that his late wife had no power to
make such will, he never having assented."266 The plaintiff in Wright was a son
from the wife's first marriage who did not receive the inheritance he wanted
and therefore contested his mother's power of appointment over her proper-
t.267
Separate estate cases also fell into the camp of trust as a form of contract,
and dealt specifically with contract enforcement.26 8 Commentators have identi-
fied the trust as a type of agreement or contract,2 69 and observed that the specif-
ic enforcement of agreements was "the core of equity."27° Claims concerning
an alimony order from the spiritual court or a private separation agreement im-
plicated Chancery's jurisdiction over promissory arrangements and invoked
258. William Searle Holdsworth, The English Trust, Its Origin and Influence in English Law, in 4
TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR RECHTSGESCHIEDENIS 367, 382 (1923).
259. R.H. Hcmholz, The Early Enforcement of Uses, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1503, 1503 (1979).
("[C]ommon law courts would neither enforce nor interpret the use ... ").
260. "Trusts were clearly going to play a key role ... because they were integral to a widely used
conveyancing device, the strict settlement." Macnair, supra note 255, at 212-13.
261. Legard, 30 Eng. Rep. at 1053; 3 Ves. at 360. This was true as well in Colmer v. Colmer, when
the husband placed all the family assets in trust and the Chancellor was forced to conclude that "the
plaintiff has no remedy but in this Court." (1729) 25 Eng. Rep. 304 (Ch.) 306; Mos. 118, 121.
262. Macnair, supra note 255 at 235.
263. Kinnoul v. Money, (1767) 36 Eng. Rep. 830 (Ch.) 830; 3 Swans 202, 202.
264. Churchill v. Dibben, (1754) 96 Eng. Rep. 1310 (Ch.) 1311; 3 Keny. 68, 70.
265. Peacock v. Monk, (1750) 28 Eng. Rep. 123 (Ch.) 123; 2 Ves. Sen. 190, 190.
266. Fettiplace v. Gorges, (1789) 29 Eng. Rep. 374 (Ch.) 374; 3 Bro. C.C. 8, 9.
267. Wright v. Englefield, (1764) 27 Eng. Rep. 308 (Ch.) 309; Amb. 469, 470.
268. Commentators note that "the distinction between trusts and contracts has not always been easi-
ly drawn... " Neil G. Jones, Aspects of Privity in England: Equity to 1680, in IUS QUAESITUM TERTIO
162 (Eltjo J.H. Schrage, ed., 2008).
269. See FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, EQUITY: A COURSE OF LECTURES 29 (John Brunyate rev. ed.,
2d ed. 1936) (1909); see also W.T. BARBOUR, THE HISTORY OF CONTRACT IN EARLY ENGLISH EQUITY
166(1914).
270. Macnair, supra note 255, at 217.
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Chancery's ability to enforce agreements. 271 For example, in Fletcher v.
Fletcher the Chancellor affirmed that Chancery had the jurisdiction to "enforce
performance of articles of separation," because the alimony award from the
spiritual court had specified terms and created an obligation.272 An alimony ar-
rangement tied to a private separation agreement was regulable by Chancery
alone because the common law would not recognize contracts between a hus-
band and wife.273
In addition, many of the separate estate cases turned on the question of the
liability of a wife's trust with respect to third party creditor claims. These cases,
which turned on questions of privity, were "in one sense a question of the
boundaries of trusts"274 and also involved an analysis of the promisor's contrac-
tual duty.27 5 Therefore, in Legard, the Chancellor remarked that Chancery had
clear jurisdiction in separate estate cases "where a third party had intervened;
,,276
and [the suit] was not only between the husband and wife. In Rutland, a
"bill was brought by a creditor of the husband's to subject [the wife's estate] to
the payment of his debt," and Chancery evaluated the right of the creditor with
respect to the wife's trust.2 7 7 Creditors also filed bills for payment from a wife's
separate estate in Pybus278 and Hulme v. Tenant.2 79 In Clinton, the wife brought
the bill before Chancery, requesting that her estate be "exonerated . . . by the
estate of her husband, from a mortgage made by the husband.,280 In these
creditor cases, despite the fact that coverture was anachronistic in many com-
mercial situations, the separate estate proved useful as a tool to protect the fam-
ily against creditors.
Chancery dealt, therefore, with the separate estate cases because of legal
questions relating to the trust form, and analyzed the legal claims of married
women based primarily on principles of property and contract. Neither com-
mon law legal rules of coverture nor the canon law regulating marriage gov-
erned the legal analysis. Chancery was therefore able to view a wife's legal
claims through a primarily economic rather than moral lens. Consequently
271. Historically, because of their ecclesiastical backgrounds, "Chancellors carried with them into
the court of Chancery the idea that faith should be kept; and enforced agreements . . . whenever they
thought that in the interests of good faith and honest dealing, they ought to be enforced." I WILLIAM
SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 456 (Little, Brown, and Company 1922) (1903).
272. Fletcher v. Fletcher, (1788) 30 Eng. Rep. 46 (Ch.) 47; 2 Cox. 99, 102.
273. Legard v. Johnson, (1797) 30 Eng. Rep. 1049 (Ch.) 1052; 3 Ves. 352, 358-59. ("The
common law will not entertain a suit upon contract by a wife against her husband. Such a contract is
incapable at law of producing any action.").
274. Jones, supra note 268, at 172.
275. Id. at 173.
276. Legard, 30 Eng. Rep. at 1053; 3 Ves. at 359.
277. Rutland v. Molineaux, (1688) 23 Eng. Rep. 651 (Ch.) 651; 2 Vein. 65, 65.
278. Pybus v. Smith, (1791) 29 Eng. Rep. 570 (Ch.); 3 Bro. C.C. 340.
279. Hulme v. Tenant, (1778) 28 Eng. Rep. 958 (Ch.); I Bro. C.C. 16. Hulme was a leading case
affirming the wife's ability to charge her separate estate.
280. Clinton v. Hooper, (1791) 29 Eng. Rep. 490 (Ch.) 490; 3 Bro. C.C. 201, 201.
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women were able to litigate their claims not just as wives but also as independ-
ent economic actors. Tim Stretton has remarked that "[w]omen, in this sense,
were litigants like any others, and the [courts of equity that] heard their causes
concentrated on the guilt or innocence of the parties before them, rather than on
whether they were male or female."
281
2. The Separate Estate as Legal Template
Chancery's separate estate jurisprudence not only allowed women to be le-
gal actors in a public, judicial forum but also formed a body of law that created
strong precedent for the subsequent increase in married women's property
rights. Married women were, thanks to Chancery, put on the record as juridical
beings who were "uncovered" for purposes pertaining to their separate estates.
These judicial holdings were cited in subsequent case law in both England and
America. The cases were also reproduced in legal treatises concerning marital
property and trust administration. Ultimately, they constituted a template that
future courts and legislatures would adopt with respect to the provision of mar-
ried women's property rights.
Chancery, in the decades leading up to the Married Women's Property
Acts, continued to provide settlements or maintenance to a wife if she was sub-
ject to cruelty or abandonment. The Chancellor in Barrow v. Barrow stated
that, "where the cause of the separation is the fault of the husband, and that it is
by reason of his misconduct that she is unable or refuses to live with him," a
wife's "equity" or right to a settlement was clear.282 The rule, stated narrowly,
was that Chancery would interfere and provision the wife financially from her
pre-marital property "where the husband has been guilty of cruelty, turned the
wife out of doors, or quitted the kingdom without making any provision for
her."
283
In cases concerning creditors' rights-a fast increasing set of cases in the
nineteenth century-Chancery continued to rule favorably for creditors, which
meant affirming a wife's right to make liable her separate estate. For example,
in Murray v. Barlee, a case concerning a married woman's liability for legal
fees incurred when separated from her husband, the court followed the rule that
married women were liable for their own debts. The Chancellor stated: "Her
separate existence, both as regards her liabilities and her rights, is [in this court]
281. STRETTON, supra note 12, at 153. Stretton analyzes women as litigants in the Court of Re-
quests, a minor equity court. Stretton also notes, however, that husbands' "position as masters of their
own families was never seriously put under threat." Id.
282. Barrow v. Barrow, (1854) 52 Eng. Rep. 208 (Ch.) 210-11; 18 Beav. 529, 536. Barrow holds
that "[a] wife's equity to a settlement includes all unsettled property to which she is entitled, whether it
be vested in her in interest before or after the marriage"). Id. at 208; 18 Beav. at 529.
283. Duncan v. Duncan, (1815)35 Eng. Rep. 549 (Ch.) 550; G. Coop. 254, 256.
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abundantly acknowledged.,284 Moreover, citing Master v. Fuller,"' the Chan-
cellor concluded that a married woman was liable for her debts because these
cases set forth the "foundation of the doctrine" that "the wife has a separate es-
tate subject to her own control, and exempt from all other interference or au-
thority.... [T]he very object of the settlement which vests it in her exclusively
is to enable her to deal with it as if she were discovert."
286
Reinforcing the strength of these foundational holdings, English treatise
writers repeated and circulated Chancery's decisions. One treatise writer ob-
served: "When the Court first established the separate estate, it violated the
laws of property between husband and wife; but it was thought beneficial, and
it prevailed. It being once settled that a wife might enjoy separate estate as a
feme sole, the laws of property attached to this new estate."287 R.S. Donnison
Roper, in his frequently-cited treatise, had an extensive chapter dedicated to de-
tailing Chancery's case law concerning "The Wife's Power over Her Separate
Property in Opposition to the Marital Rights of Her Husband.,288 Treatise writ-
ers discussed and debated the finer points of separate estate doctrine, in addi-
tion to relaying judicial opinion, and in so doing entrenched the separate estate
289in legal doctrine.
The property rights provided by the separate estate also acted as a model
and template for married women's property rights in the future statutory en-
actments-the Acts that would, in the minds of many, bring about an end to
coverture. 29 In 1870, the United Kingdom passed its first Married Women's
Property Act, and married women gained rights over any earnings that they ob-
tained separate from their husbands.291 Married women also gained control
over personal property held in bank accounts, stocks, or shares, as well as the
right to any amount under £200 left to them in wills, and the right to control the
rent from any freehold and copyhold property bequeathed them.292 In 1882,
284. Murray v. Barlee, (1834)40 Eng. Rep. 80 (Ch.) 84; 3 MY. & K. 220, 222.
285. Master v. Fuller, (1792) 29 Eng. Rep. 757 (Ch.); 4 Bro. C.C. 19.
286. Murray, 40 Eng. Rep. at 85; 3 MY. & K. at 223. While married women were held increasingly
liable for debts, the right of alienation was highly contested in the nineteenth century. Chancellors dur-
ing this period, in response to the expansive rights granted by their predecessors, used the "restraint on
anticipation" to limit a wife's right to alienate or borrow money against her separate estate. See STAVES,
supra note 8, at 153. The restraint on anticipation appeared around the turn of the century and was well
established by the 1830s. Id.; see also SPRING, supra note 8, at 115.
287. 2 JOHN EDWARD BRIGHT, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF HUSBAND AND WIFE, AS RESPECTS
PROPERTY 287 (London, William Benning & Co. 1849).
288. ROPER, supra note 209, at 151.
289. See, e.g., LEONARD SHELFORD, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE 398 (London, S. Sweet 1841).
290. See, e.g., MARY LYNDON SHANLEY, FEMINISM, MARRIAGE, AND THE LAW IN VICTORIAN
ENGLAND, 1850-1895, at 103 (1993).
291. Married Women's Property Act, 1870,33 & 34 Vict. 93 (U.K.).
292. Mary Beth Combs, Wives and Household Wealth: The Impact of the 1870 British Married
Women's Property Act on Wealth-Holding and Share of Household Resources, 19 CONTINUITY &
CHANGE 141, 145 (2004) ("[T]he Act provided women with the opportunity to change their investment
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Parliament amended the Act, expanding the protections offered to married
women and creating a more comprehensive set of rights. These additional
rights and responsibilities of property-ownership came almost directly from
separate estate rules.
The amended Act stated: "A married woman shall, in accordance with the
provisions of this Act, be capable of acquiring, holding, and disposing by will
or otherwise, of any real or personal property as her separate property, in the
same manner as if she were a feme sole, without the intervention of any trus-
tee.' 293 Married women were also capable of rendering themselves liable for
amounts pledged from their separate property, and the Act provided creditors
with recourse against both husbands and wives trying to shield separate proper-
ty. Moreover, a wife could act as a creditor, last in line as with the separate es-
tate, when she loaned money to her husband from her separate property. The
language from separate estate trust instruments and Chancery decisions served
as a model for statutory language.
Furthermore, the influence of the separate estate travelled across the Atlan-
tic. Early American treatise writers and commentators on equity voiced support
for the separate estate and generally accepted the trust form as inherited from
294the English. In Law of Baron and Femme, Tapping Reeve stated that the
broad contours of the separate estate were "fully established.',295 According to
Reeve: "A wife may have separate property, distinct from her husband, in
which the husband has not any interest, both in personal and real estate."
296
Similarly, James Clancy, in his A Treatise of the Rights, Duties and Liabilities
of Husband and Wife, agreed that "every species of property may be conveyed
to trustees for the separate use of a married woman, and a court of equity will
enforce the performance of the trust, and protect it against the legal rights of the
husband."
297
The separate estate also had some notable successes in American state
courts, particularly in those states that had established chancery courts and sup-
portfolios and shift wealth-holding from forms of real property to forms of personal property, such as
stocks, that had the potential to earn higher real returns").
293. Married Women's Property Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vict. 75, § 1 (U.K.).
294. Lawrence Friedman points out that Americans were the most "avid customers" when Black-
stone's Commentaries were published, and a 1771 American edition sold 1,557 sets on a subscription
basis making it one of the most "ubiquitous [texts] on the American legal scene." LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 102 (1985). Friedman adds, "Lawbooks were more common
in the 18th century. But a lawyer's library was not full of books about American law; the books were
English law books." Id.
295. TAPPING REEVE, THE LAW OF BARON AND FEMME, OF PARENT AND CHILD, GUARDIAN AND
WARD, MASTER AND SERVANT, AND OF THE POWERS OF THE COURTS OF CHANCERY, WITH AN ESSAY
ON THE TERMS, HEIR, HEIRS, AND HEIRS OF THE BODY 181 (Burlington, VT, Lucius E. Chittenden 1846).
296. Id. at 162.
297. JAMES CLANCY, A TREATISE OF THE RIGHTS, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF HUSBAND AND
WIFE 255 (1828). Clancy noted that a "term of years" was the exception and could not be made into a
separate estate. Id. at 495.
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ported equitable jurisdiction.298 In a typical 1874 case from Virginia, Burnett v.
Hawpe's Executor, the state Supreme Court cited Grigby v. Cox 2 99 (as well as
several other cases from the Grigby period) in affirming a married woman's
right to her separate property. The court stated:
It is the established doctrine of this court, that a married woman, as to
property settled to her separate use, is to be regarded as a feme sole,
and has the right to dispose of all her separate personal estate, and the
rents and profits of her separate real estate, in the same manner as if
she were a feme sole, unless herpower of alienation be restrained by
the instrument creating the estate.
300
The court concluded that, because the terms of the separate estate gave the
wife full control over the assets in the trust, the wife had full power to create an
obligation and charge the separate estate.
The separate estate furthermore provided a template not just for English
statutory enactments but also American ones. New York's Married Women's
Property Act, passed in 1848, was a model for the states that subsequently
passed similar legislation. The Act has a familiar ring to readers of the original
Chancery cases:
It shall be lawful for any married female to receive, by gift, grant de-
vise or bequest, from any person other than her husband, and hold to
her sole and separate use, as if she were a single female, real and per-
sonal property, and the rents, issues and profits thereof, and the same
shall not be subject to the disposal of her husband, nor be liable for his
debts.
30 1
New statutory rights were modeled on and traced over those that had been
pioneered by the separate estate.302 In this way, the separate estate had prodi-
gious precedential value, in the case law that followed as well as in statutory
enactments, and was a forerunner to more modem forms of married women's
property.
298. See SALMON, supra note 13, at 81-140; see also Erwin C. Surrency, The Courts in the Ameri-
can Colonies, 11 AM. J. LEGAL HIST., 253, 272 (1967) (describing the mixed success of equity courts in
the American colonies).
299. Grigby v. Cox, (1750) 27 Eng. Rep. 1178 (Ch.); I Ves. Sen 518.
300. Burnett v. Hawpe's Ex'r, 25 Va. (1 Gratt. ) 481, 486 (1874).
301. 1848 N.Y. Laws 307, ch. 200, §3.
302. See ERICKSON, supra note 5, at 103 ("[The separate estate] is also important as the basis of the
late nineteenth-century reform of married women's property law in both England and America.").
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CONCLUSION
The separate estate was an innovative trust form that allowed women to
own property at a time when the rules of coverture otherwise prohibited it.
With a separate estate, created in anticipation of marriage by either the bride's
family or by the bride herself, a married woman could control property and
spend income that could not, in theory, be reached or controlled by a husband
or his creditors.
Analyzing the claims that were litigated in Chancery, we can see that the
most contentious aspects of the separate estate were access to income during
marital separations, the rights of creditors, and the ability of the wife to devise
her property in trust. As the Chancellor's decisions made clear, a wife's rights
with respect to her separate estate were variable and partly conditioned on fac-
tors such as the terms of the trust agreement or the type of property. For these
reasons, historians have not usually depicted the separate estate as a robust ve-
hicle for enhancing and extending the property rights of married women.
This view of the separate estate does a disservice to the innovative nature
of this trust form. The separate estate gave married women control of income,
and allowed wives suffering from cruel and abusive treatment to live apart from
their husbands. The separate estate enabled wives to recover money from their
husbands, by acting as creditors on his assets and estate. Moreover, separate
estate trusts were sometimes written such that the wife had control over both
income and principal. Thanks to the separate estate, married women were able
to devise property and direct sometimes-significant amounts of capital.
In addition, because Chancery had jurisdiction over questions pertaining to
trust law and allowed claims from married women, these women gained a legal
forum in which they were able to pursue claims and recover property. The sep-
arate estate helped to transform women into litigants. As litigants, exercising
their nascent property rights, the wives who brought their claims to Chancery
helped to build a body of precedential cases that served as the template for fu-
ture statutory enactments, both in England and America, that granted married
women property rights.
Finally, through the separate estate cases in the eighteenth century, Chan-
cery firmly established the notion that law could treat a married woman as sin-
gle for certain purposes. Chancery's separate estate jurisprudence, by establish-
ing the married woman as a feme sole with respect to her separate property,
fractured coverture's unitary rule and helped to entrench in the legal imagina-
tion the idea that married women could act, invest, spend, and litigate as indi-
viduals separate from their husbands. The axiomatic legal conclusion Chancery
promulgated was that "where any thing is settled to the wife's separate use, she
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is considered as a feme sole."303 Taking this even further, in Kinnoul v. Money,
the Chancellor stated that, in evaluating a separate estate case, he would con-
sider a husband and wife "as two persons, and ... dissolved the marriage,
quoad (for the duration o) the transaction."
304
Taken seriously, these were radical statements that struck at the heart of
coverture. Through the configuration of the wife as a separate entity, this juris-
prudence created fissures in the brittle surface of coverture and introduced the
idea of divided household sovereignty. From this perspective, the separate es-
tate was a marker of destabilized gender roles, the fracturing of coverture, and
305the disruption of absolute sovereignty within the household. The separate es-
tate was not, therefore, an ineffective tool for married women but rather a ro-
bust trust form that moved forward married women's property rights and of-
fered a template for future rights-holding. The separate estate was the
beginning of the end of coverture.
303. Grigbyv. Cox, (1750)27 Eng. Rep. 1178 (Ch.) 1178; 1 Ves. Sen. 518, 518.
304. Kinnoul v. Money, (1767) 36 Eng. Rep. 830 (Ch.) 836; 3 Swans 202, 217.
305. That the separate estate contributed to a certain destabilization of gender roles may be seen
from the vehement and derogatory response from a majority of writers and cultural commentators.
"[P]in money was a subject of satire and a fact almost universally lamented by gentleman moralists."
STAVES, supra note 8, at 158; see also ERICKSON, supra note 5, at 108.
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